Olaguer v. Purugganan

G.R. No. 158907 · 2007-02-12 · J. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Commercial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Petitioner Eduardo B. Olaguer alleged ownership of 60,000 shares in Businessday Corporation and executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) appointing respondents Raul Locsin, Enrique Joaquin, and Hector Holifeña as his attorneys-in-fact to sell his shares, intending to conceal his ownership during the Marcos dictatorship. Petitioner was arrested and detained, and respondent Locsin allegedly instructed respondent Emilio Purugganan, Jr., the Corporate Secretary, to cancel petitioner's shares and transfer them to Locsin's name, with petitioner claiming he was tricked into endorsing a stock certificate that was then marked 'cancelled.' Petitioner also alleged that from 1980 to 1982, Businessday deposited ₱10,000.00 twice monthly to his in-laws' accounts as continued salary payments, which stopped after he received ₱600,000.00, and upon his release in 1986, he discovered he was no longer a stockholder and that Purugganan had recorded the transfer of shares to Locsin, leading him to file a complaint to declare the sale illegal, restore ownership, and claim damages. Respondent Locsin countered that petitioner had asked him to sell or buy the shares if necessary to support his family, denied any agreement to continue petitioner's salary, claimed he tried to sell the shares but found no buyers due to petitioner's oppositionist activities and Businessday's poor financial condition, and then decided to buy the shares himself at par value, borrowing funds from Businessday and paying petitioner in installments. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed petitioner's complaint, ruling that the sale of shares was valid and that petitioner intended to sell them for his family's support, finding that the SPA empowered Locsin to sell the shares and that petitioner consented to Locsin buying them, having received ₱600,000.00 through his wife and in-laws. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision, finding a perfected contract of sale or, alternatively, ratification by petitioner's receipt of the purchase price and failure to protest, and finding the ₱10,000.00 monthly deposits inconsistent with petitioner's salary and consistent with the par value of his shares, while noting the irregularity in the cancellation and transfer of shares but deeming it inconsequential to a consummated sale. The Petition: Petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court, raising issues regarding the validity of the sale, his consent, the nature of the payments received, the party to the sale, and the irregularity of the share cancellation.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was a perfected contract of sale between petitioner and respondent Locsin over the shares, and whether petitioner consented to the alleged sale of the shares to respondent Locsin. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the amounts received by petitioner's in-laws were not petitioner's salary from the corporation but installment payments for the shares. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondent Locsin was the party to the alleged sale of the shares and not the corporation. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the alleged sale of the shares was valid although the cancellation of the shares was irregular.

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the validity of the sale of shares of stock in favor of respondent Locsin.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of a perfected contract of sale and petitioner's consent: The Court held that the petitioner's arguments regarding the strict interpretation of the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) were unpersuasive. While a power of attorney is generally strictly construed, this rule is not absolute and should not defeat the purpose of the instrument. Limiting the terms 'absence' and 'incapacity' to their strict legal definitions under Articles 381 and 38 of the Civil Code would render the SPA ineffective, especially since petitioner had already appointed agents for specific acts of administration. Interpreting these terms in their everyday usage – 'the state of not being present' and 'the inability to act' – reasonably covers the situation of petitioner's arrest and detention. Furthermore, the Court found the petitioner's claim that the shares could only be sold to satisfy his obligations to the company to be far-fetched, as the SPA's language, using 'and' in enumerating authorized acts, indicated a broader scope. The Court also found petitioner's contention that he did not consent to the sale unsustainable, given that he received installment payments totaling ₱600,000.00 through his wife and in-laws without protest for four years. His inconsistent statements regarding the endorsement of stock certificates and his continued receipt of payments after being informed of the sale further supported the conclusion that he had consented to the transaction. The Court also noted that respondent Locsin's act of depositing the funds into the in-laws' accounts, rather than directly to petitioner, was a practical measure to conceal the transaction from the military, consistent with the purpose of the SPA. Article 1882 of the Civil Code, which states that an agent's limits are not exceeded if performed more advantageously to the principal, was also considered. On the nature of the payments received: The Court found petitioner's allegation that the installment payments were salaries to be unsupported and implausible. The monthly amount received (₱20,000.00) did not correspond to his stated monthly salary (₱24,000.00), nor to the amount Businessday was allegedly obliged to pay (₱45,000.00 to ₱60,000.00 per annum). Moreover, the payments stopped precisely when the total amount received reached the aggregate par value of his shares (₱600,000.00). The Court also noted that any arrangement for petitioner to receive 'salaries' for work not performed, while on an extended leave of absence, would constitute a void donation under Article 748 of the Civil Code, as it was not made in writing. The use of the phrase 'household expenses' on deposit slips was explained as a tactic to conceal the transaction from the military, given that the money was deposited into the in-laws' accounts due to the confiscation of some of petitioner's property. On the party to the sale: The Court rejected petitioner's argument that Businessday, not respondent Locsin, was the party to the transaction. Respondent Locsin's explanation that he obtained cash advances from the company to pay petitioner, and that the term 'shares of stock' was used in company records for specificity rather than 'cash advances,' was supported by financial records and the testimony of the company's Accounting Manager. The stock and transfer books, which showed an increase in Locsin's shares resulting from the cancellation and transfer of petitioner's shares, further corroborated that the transaction was between petitioner and Locsin, not with the corporation itself. On the validity of the sale despite irregular cancellation of shares: The Court acknowledged that the manner of cancellation of petitioner's certificates of stock and the issuance of new certificates in favor of respondent Locsin was irregular. However, this irregularity did not invalidate the sale, as Section 63 of the Corporation Code, which requires delivery of endorsed certificates for a valid transfer, could not be applied without causing injustice. The Court found that there was a valid sale of stocks, and petitioner's failure to deliver the shares to the buyer constituted a breach of his duty as a seller, which he could not use to deny the sale's validity. The Court also noted that petitioner had consented to the cancellation of his name from the stock and transfer book even before the shares were sold, as part of his intention to conceal his ownership. Therefore, while the procedure was irregular, the sale itself was deemed valid between the parties.

Main Doctrine

A Special Power of Attorney (SPA) should be construed to carry out, not defeat, its purpose. The terms 'absence' and 'incapacity' in an SPA should be interpreted in their everyday usage, especially when a strict legal definition would render the SPA ineffective. Furthermore, a principal's receipt of installment payments for shares, coupled with a failure to protest the sale for an extended period, can constitute ratification of the sale, even if the transfer of shares in the corporate books was irregular.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →