Banco Filipino v. Tala Realty
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case arises from a dispute over unpaid rent between Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (petitioner) and Tala Realty Services Corporation (private respondent). The private respondent sought to evict the petitioner from its branch offices located in nine different locations due to non-payment of rent. These properties were leased by the petitioner from the private respondent under separate, similarly worded contracts. Procedural History: A prior ejectment case concerning the Iloilo City branch, G.R. No. 132051, resulted in a Supreme Court decision on June 25, 2001, ordering the petitioner to vacate and pay back rent. This decision was later modified by a July 24, 2002 resolution imposing interest. However, a subsequent November 22, 2002 En Banc decision in a related case (G.R. No. 137533) involving the Malolos, Bulacan branch, found the petitioner not liable for unpaid rentals due to the parties' involvement in circumventing banking laws, though it acknowledged the lessor's right to eject based on lease expiration. Consequently, the Third Division of the Supreme Court, by resolution dated September 3, 2003, granted the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. 132051, applying the En Banc ruling and stating that the lessor should not collect rent. The Entry of Judgment on September 26, 2003, reflected these resolutions as final and executory. The Petition: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Municipal Trial Court's (MTC) February 26, 2004 order granting the private respondent's motion for execution of the June 25, 2001 Supreme Court decision. The petitioner argued that the MTC judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, by ordering execution of a decision that had been superseded by the September 3, 2003 resolution. The petitioner contended that the September 3, 2003 resolution, which declared the bank not liable for unpaid rents, was the final disposition and directly contradicted the earlier decision sought to be executed. The petition also raised concerns about not being adequately heard on the motion for execution.
Issue(s)
Whether public respondent acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of this Court’s June 25, 2001 Decision in G.R. No. 132051. Whether public respondent gravely abused his discretion in allegedly refusing to hear petitioner on private respondent’s Motion for Execution.
Ruling
The petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed orders dated February 26, 2004 and March 29, 2004, as well as the writ of execution dated April 6, 2004, issued by public respondent Judge Amalik P. Espinosa, Jr., are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion in ordering execution: Public respondent Judge Espinosa acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction when he ordered the execution of this Court’s Decision of June 25, 2001 in G.R. No. 132051. The said decision was not the final resolution of petitioner's appeal as contemplated by Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The records clearly showed that subsequent resolutions, specifically the Resolution of July 24, 2002, modified the original decision, and this modification was further altered by the Resolution of September 3, 2003. This latter resolution, which applied the pronouncement from the Court En Banc case (G.R. No. 137533), stated that Tala should not be allowed to collect rent from the Bank during the period in question. This pronouncement was diametrically inconsistent with the directive in the June 25, 2001 Decision for the Bank to pay monthly rentals. Therefore, the June 25, 2001 Decision, not being the final resolution, was not a judgment that private respondent was entitled to execute as a matter of right. The writ of execution itself also fell short of the requirements under Rule 39, Section 8(e), as it failed to specifically state the amount of interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the date of its issuance. Given that public respondent was sufficiently apprised of these circumstances, he should have exercised more circumspection before granting the motion for execution. His act of ordering the execution of a superseded decision constituted an overstepping of his authority. On the issue of whether petitioner was heard: While it is opined that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires notice to the adverse party and a hearing when circumstances so require, allowing the party to file objections or bring to the court's attention matters that may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal, the circumstances surrounding the Motion for Execution in this case did call for petitioner to present its side. Granting that petitioner's counsel was cut off and its written opposition was not fully considered, petitioner was still able to proffer its objections when it filed a motion to reconsider the order granting the Motion for Execution. In this motion, petitioner reiterated the arguments it raised during the hearing and in its written opposition. These circumstances were noted in public respondent’s order denying the motion for reconsideration. Therefore, while the initial hearing might have been procedurally flawed, petitioner was afforded an opportunity to present its objections through its motion for reconsideration.
Main Doctrine
A motion for execution of a judgment that has been modified by subsequent resolutions, which were also declared final and executory, cannot be granted as a matter of right. The writ of execution must conform to the final judgment, not an earlier decision that has been superseded.