Loyola v. Mendoza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Hermenegilda de la Cruz Loyola (petitioner) filed a complaint for annulment and/or reconveyance of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 213, issued to Anastacio Mendoza (respondent) via free patent on May 11, 1984, over a 1,668-square meter parcel of land. Petitioner alleged that respondent obtained the title through fraud, as she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since 1948. Petitioner's grandfather, Julio Pili, owned a larger parcel, from which he transferred a portion to petitioner's father, Francisco de la Cruz, in 1950. Francisco remained in possession until 1976 when he mortgaged it. Petitioner claimed that in 1976, unknown to her father and the mortgagees, the land was transferred to Juana de la Cruz Vda. De Mendoza, who then entered into a simulated sale with her son, respondent. Petitioner asserted that neither Juana nor Anastacio possessed the property, and no notice of the free patent application was sent to Francisco. Procedural History: The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) found that fraud attended the issuance of OCT No. 213 and directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a petition for cancellation. The OSG advised petitioner to file the case herself. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, declaring OCT No. 213 null and void and ordering the issuance of a new title in petitioner's name, with damages. Respondent filed a motion to declare the decision null and void, which was denied. He filed a second motion for reconsideration, also denied. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed the RTC decision, dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in reversing the RTC decision, that she and her predecessors were the rightful owners, that her documentary evidence was sufficient, that there was irregularity in the grant of the free patent, and that her cause of action had not prescribed. The core issue was whether the CA committed reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision and holding that petitioner was not entitled to reconveyance.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, considering the timeliness of the appeal. Whether the petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest were the true and rightful owners of the subject property, and whether the documentary evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a belief that she is entitled to reconveyance of the subject parcel of land. Whether there was irregularity in the application and subsequent grant of free patent to the private respondent, considering the land's status as private property. Whether the cause of action of the petitioner had already prescribed. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal filed by the respondent. Whether the merits of the case warrant condoning the late filing of the notice of appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Court held that the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the respondent's appeal because the notice of appeal was filed late.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction (timeliness of appeal): The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the appeal because the respondent's notice of appeal was patently filed late. Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court explicitly prohibits a second motion for reconsideration. The filing of such a motion did not toll the running of the period to appeal. The period to appeal began to run from January 4, 2001, when respondent received notice of the trial court's order denying his first motion for reconsideration. Thus, respondent had until January 19, 2001, to appeal. His Notice of Appeal, filed on March 12, 2001, was 67 days late. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with law. Failure to file a timely appeal renders the decision final and executory, depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that not even the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a final and executory decision. Therefore, the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it entertained the late appeal and modified the trial court's final and executory decision. On the issue of ownership and sufficiency of evidence: A careful review of the records revealed that the petitioner had shown she acquired ownership of the subject land by acquisitive prescription before the respondent obtained OCT No. 213 through fraud. The petitioner had established that the land had been in possession of her predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s, making it private land ipso jure before OCT No. 213 was issued. On the issue of irregularity in the grant of free patent: The DENR had found fraud in the transfer of the property to Juana de la Cruz Vda. De Mendoza. The respondent's free patent was void ab initio because the land was already private property and not part of the disposable public domain when the patent was issued. The respondent was also guilty of misrepresentation in his application. No specific ratio provided for prescription, assuming it was not a deciding factor given the finding of fraud and prior private ownership. On the issue of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction: The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the appeal because the respondent's notice of appeal was patently filed late. Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court explicitly prohibits a second motion for reconsideration. The filing of such a motion did not toll the running of the period to appeal. The period to appeal began to run from January 4, 2001, when respondent received notice of the trial court's order denying his first motion for reconsideration. Thus, respondent had until January 19, 2001, to appeal. His Notice of Appeal, filed on March 12, 2001, was 67 days late. The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised in accordance with law. Failure to file a timely appeal renders the decision final and executory, depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that not even the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a final and executory decision. Therefore, the Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction when it entertained the late appeal and modified the trial court's final and executory decision. On the merits of the case (as a secondary consideration): Although the primary basis for granting the petition was the appellate court's lack of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court noted that it had, in rare and exceptional cases, condoned late filing of notices of appeal to prevent grave injustice. However, in this instance, the trial court's decision was clearly in accord with justice. Thus, there was no meritorious reason to relax the rules on the perfection of appeals.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration does not toll the period to appeal. Failure to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period renders the decision final and executory, and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.