KKK Foundation, Inc. v. Calderon-Bargas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint for the annulment of an extra-judicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage and the nullification of the sheriff's auction sale, along with a claim for damages and a request for injunctive relief. The petitioner alleged several defects in the foreclosure process, including the absence of a public bidding, failure to post the required notice of sale, a fatally defective petition for foreclosure involving properties of two different entities, an inadequate bid price awarded to Imelda A. Angeles, and the sale of eight parcels of land under individual titles en masse. Procedural History: Initially, a temporary restraining order was issued, followed by a Compromise Agreement between KKK Foundation, Inc. and Imelda A. Angeles, wherein the petitioner agreed to pay the bid price within 20 days. However, the petitioner later sought to recall this agreement, alleging lack of consultation. The trial court, per Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas, initially declared both the motion to recall and the motion to approve the compromise agreement as mere scraps of paper due to procedural defects. Subsequently, the trial court approved the Compromise Agreement, which stipulated that the petitioner would pay P5,500,000.00 within 20 days, after which Angeles would execute a Deed of Redemption and Cancellation of Mortgage. Angeles then moved for a writ of execution. The trial court issued orders related to this motion, which the petitioner argued were issued without due process and before its motion for reconsideration was resolved. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petitioner's subsequent petition for certiorari, finding that the petitioner was not denied due process and that certain issues were not yet resolved by the trial court. The Petition: Petitioner KKK Foundation, Inc. seeks review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's actions. Specifically, the petitioner contends that it was denied procedural due process when the trial court issued orders and a writ of execution without allowing sufficient time for comment and before resolving its motion for reconsideration. It also argues that the motion for writ of execution lacked the requisite notice of hearing and that the issued writ of execution varied the tenor of the approved Compromise Agreement by including an option for consolidation of ownership, which was not part of the agreement. The petitioner requests that the writ of execution be declared null and void.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the October 3, 2002 and October 10, 2002 Orders without awaiting petitioner’s comment. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution although it lacked the requisite notice of hearing. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ of execution that varied the tenor of the decision dated June 28, 2002.
Ruling
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The writ of execution issued on October 11, 2002, by Judge Adelina Calderon-Bargas is declared NULL and VOID. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, Branch 78, to issue another writ of execution in conformity with the Decision dated June 28, 2002.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue: The Court found that petitioner was not denied due process regarding the issuance of the October 3, 2002 and October 10, 2002 Orders. The trial court had given petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment on the motion for writ of execution. While petitioner claimed to have received the order later, the trial court's own declaration indicated personal service on September 12, 2002, giving petitioner until September 22, 2002, to file its comment or seek an extension. Therefore, petitioner's motion for extension and comment were not seasonably filed, and this procedural lapse bound the petitioner. On the second issue: While the motion for issuance of a writ of execution lacked a specific date and time for hearing, the Court held that petitioner was not denied procedural due process. The trial court, upon receiving the motion, issued an order giving petitioner ten (10) days to file its comment. The court ruled on the motion only after this period lapsed. This afforded petitioner the opportunity to study and comment on the motion, thereby achieving the purpose of a notice of hearing. The Court reiterated that procedural rules are liberally construed to achieve a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. On the third issue: The Court found that the writ of execution was indeed erroneous because it varied the tenor of the judgment. The Compromise Agreement, approved by the trial court, stipulated that upon payment of P5,500,000.00, Angeles would execute a Certificate of Deed of Redemption and a Deed of Cancellation of Mortgage, and surrender the titles. However, the writ of execution gave Sheriff Bisnar the option to "allow the consolidation of the subject real properties in favor of the defendant Imelda Angeles," an alternative obligation not contemplated in the Compromise Agreement. The Court emphasized that a writ of execution must conform to the judgment and cannot vary or exceed its terms; otherwise, it has no validity.
Main Doctrine
A writ of execution must conform to the judgment it seeks to enforce and cannot vary or exceed its terms. If it does, it is void.