Soriano v. Commission on Elections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners and private respondents were candidates for City Council in the First and Second Districts of Muntinlupa City in the May 10, 2004 elections. After the proclamation of private respondents, petitioners filed election protest cases. The COMELEC First Division consolidated these cases. Procedural History: On June 26, 2004, the COMELEC First Division issued Orders directing petitioners and private respondents to each deposit substantial amounts to defray expenses for the revision of ballots in the First and Second Districts of Muntinlupa City, citing Section 8, Rule 20 of the COMELEC Rules. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the COMELEC First Division on July 30, 2004. Subsequently, on May 31, 2005, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the protests and counter-protests for failure to pay the required cash deposits. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to nullify the June 26, 2004 Orders, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. They argued that the cash deposits should be paid jointly by all protestants for each district, not individually.
Issue(s)
Whether a writ of certiorari will lie in this case. Whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated June 26, 2004.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is denied.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a writ of certiorari will lie: The Court held that a petition for certiorari will not lie against an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division if a motion for reconsideration was not first filed with the COMELEC Division itself. The general rule, as mandated by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 19, Section 5 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, is that motions for reconsideration of decisions, resolutions, orders, or rulings of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. However, for interlocutory orders, Rule 3, Section 5(c) of the COMELEC Rules provides that such motions shall be resolved by the division which issued the order, unless all members of the division unanimously decide to refer the matter to the COMELEC En Banc. The Court cited Bulaong v. Comelec and Kho v. Comelec to support the principle that a COMELEC Division is not mandated to refer all motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders to the COMELEC En Banc, and that direct resort to the Supreme Court via certiorari is permissible only when the COMELEC Division commits grave abuse of discretion or acts without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders, and the controversy does not fall under instances where the COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. The Court also noted the ruling in Ambil, Jr. v. Comelec which dismissed a petition for prematurity for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order before filing a certiorari petition with the Supreme Court. The Court reiterated in Repol v. Commission on Elections that the Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC, unless an exception applies, such as when the order is a patent nullity or when the need for relief is extremely urgent. In the present case, the assailed orders involved the interpretation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and were not patent nullities, thus direct resort to the Supreme Court was not proper without first filing a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC First Division. On the issue of whether the COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion: The Court found that the petition was dismissible on procedural grounds, rendering the substantive issue of grave abuse of discretion moot. The Court noted that the COMELEC First Division had already issued an Order dated May 31, 2005, dismissing the protests and counter-protests for failure to pay the required cash deposits. This dismissal rendered the interlocutory orders regarding the deposits no longer the primary subject of the case, and the dismissal itself would be the proper subject of appeal or reconsideration. The Court emphasized that the situation where an interlocutory order is pending before the Supreme Court while the main case has already been dismissed by the COMELEC is precisely what the rules aim to avoid by insisting on strict compliance with the procedural requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration before elevating the matter to a higher court.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari will not lie against an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division if a motion for reconsideration was not first filed with the COMELEC Division itself, unless an exception applies, such as when the interlocutory order is a patent nullity due to absence of jurisdiction. Direct resort to the Supreme Court from an interlocutory order of a COMELEC Division is generally not permissible, as it bypasses the mandatory procedural steps of exhausting administrative remedies within the COMELEC.