Tan v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: James L. King filed a complaint charging Roderick Lim-Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, John Doe, and Peter Doe with violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and Estafa, involving several checks totaling over P80 million. A supplemental complaint added Grace Tan-Go, Rolando Tan, Elena Tan, and Lamberto Tan as respondents, alleging a conspiracy related to a business transaction where spouses Go borrowed cash from King in exchange for postdated checks. The complaint detailed how the checks, initially honored, were later dishonored due to insufficient funds, following an alleged attack by Roderick Go on King. Procedural History: Following the complaints, a preliminary investigation was conducted. Initially assigned to one prosecutor, it was later designated to Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hermes Montero. Montero found probable cause to file criminal informations for violations of B.P. 22 and Estafa against various individuals, including the petitioners. Five informations for estafa were filed against Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, and the petitioners, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. CBU-64381, 64383, 64385, 64386, and 64387. The petitioners posted bail, were arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. They then filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with the Court of Appeals, seeking to halt the proceedings and dismiss the cases against them. The Court of Appeals dismissed this petition, finding that the petitioners had not availed themselves of other adequate remedies and that the issues raised were matters of defense for the trial court. The Petition: The petitioners seek a review of the Court of Appeals' decision dismissing their petition for prohibition. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling on the legality and validity of the estafa informations filed by Prosecutor Montero, and in failing to find that no estafa lies against them as they allegedly received no funds from the transactions. They also contend that the finding of probable cause was erroneous and that no conspiracy existed. The Supreme Court, however, found that the petitioners' resort to prohibition was improper as they failed to avail themselves of the remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice and that their actions constituted forum-shopping by pursuing parallel remedies in different fora.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for prohibition and injunction. Whether petitioners availed themselves of plain, speedy, and adequate remedies to challenge the finding of probable cause. Whether the public prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause against the petitioners. Whether the Secretary of Justice was duly authorized to designate Prosecutor Montero to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the informations. Whether the issues raised by petitioners are matters of defense to be threshed out during trial.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 24, 2003, and its Resolution dated July 14, 2004, are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the writ of prohibition: The Court reiterated that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners failed to establish that they had no other adequate remedy. They received the Joint Resolution finding probable cause on November 13, 2002, but did not move for reconsideration or appeal to the Secretary of Justice before their arraignment on November 19, 2002. The Court of Appeals found no evidence of them being "forced arraigned," and the presumption of regularity in the performance of the trial judge's functions applies. Furthermore, other co-accused were able to appeal to the Secretary of Justice, demonstrating the availability of the remedy. The arguments raised by petitioners primarily questioned the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause, which are matters that should have been raised in a timely appeal to the Secretary of Justice, not through a petition for prohibition. The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal. On the availability of other remedies: The Court found that petitioners failed to avail themselves of the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of appeal to the Secretary of Justice from the Joint Resolution finding probable cause. Their claim of being "forced arraigned" to prevent an appeal was unsubstantiated, and the arraignment proceeded without objection. The fact that other co-accused successfully appealed to the Secretary of Justice further undermined petitioners' contention that no adequate remedy existed. Therefore, the petition for prohibition was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to exhaust available remedies. On grave abuse of discretion: Petitioners failed to prove that public respondent Montero acted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion requires more than mere error of judgment; it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The designation of Prosecutor Montero by the Secretary of Justice was within the latter's authority. The finding of probable cause was based on the evidence presented, and any dispute regarding the sufficiency or credibility of such evidence is a matter of defense to be resolved during the trial of the criminal cases. On the authority of Prosecutor Montero: The Secretary of Justice, through Department Order No. 369, duly designated public respondent Prosecutor Hermes Montero to continue with the preliminary investigation and, if warranted, to file the appropriate informations. This designation was within the Secretary of Justice's power and authority. Therefore, the informations filed by Prosecutor Montero were validly filed. On issues as matters of defense: The Court held that the petitioners' claims contesting the public prosecutor's finding of probable cause are essentially defenses that should be raised and threshed out during the trial of the criminal cases. The preliminary investigation's purpose is merely to determine whether probable cause exists to justify the filing of an information, not to definitively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused. Resorting to prohibition to resolve these issues would preempt the trial court's function and bypass the proper appellate process.
Main Doctrine
The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal, and issues regarding the factual and legal bases of a finding of probable cause should be threshed out during trial or through a timely appeal to the Secretary of Justice, not through prohibition.