Ramos v. De la Costa
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Bonifacio Inepto obtained a homestead patent for a parcel of land on January 24, 1918, which was duly registered on February 19, 1919. On March 30, 1920, Inepto sold this land to Eusebio F. Ramos via a deed of absolute sale. 2. Procedural History: Eusebio F. Ramos presented the deed of absolute sale and the owner's duplicate certificate of title to Sixto de la Costa, the register of deeds for Nueva Ecija, on March 31, 1920, and April 17, 1920, respectively, requesting registration and a transfer certificate of title. The respondent registrar unlawfully refused to register the deed and issue the certificate on May 5, 1920. Ramos sought reconsideration on May 11, 1920. 3. The Petition: This is an original petition filed in the Supreme Court seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent register of deeds to register the deed of absolute sale. The respondent demurred, citing Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits alienation of lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions for five years. The petitioner argues that Act No. 2874 was not in effect when the patent was issued and has no retroactive application to this case.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent register of deeds unlawfully refused to register the deed of absolute sale. Whether Section 116 of Act No. 2874 prohibits the alienation of the land in question.
Ruling
The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer and ordered that the writ of mandamus be granted, directing the respondent to register the deed of absolute sale and issue the corresponding certificate of transfer, unless the respondent answers within five days from notice.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent register of deeds unlawfully refused to register the deed of absolute sale: The respondent's refusal was unlawful because the legal basis for his refusal, Section 116 of Act No. 2874, was not applicable to the case. The respondent argued that the land, having been acquired through a homestead patent, could not be alienated within five years from the issuance of the patent, citing Section 116 of Act No. 2874. However, the Court found that this Act was not in force at the time the homestead patent was issued to Bonifacio Inepto. The patent was issued on January 24, 1918, while Act No. 2874 was enacted on November 29, 1919. Therefore, the prohibition contained in the later Act could not retroactively apply to a transaction that occurred when such a prohibition did not exist. The Court emphasized that Act No. 2874 applies only to public lands and has no retroactive effect. On the issue of whether Section 116 of Act No. 2874 prohibits the alienation of the land in question: The Court held that Section 116 of Act No. 2874 does not prohibit the alienation of the land in question. This is because the Act itself was enacted subsequent to the issuance of the homestead patent. The principle of non-retroactivity of laws dictates that a law cannot prejudice rights acquired prior to its enactment. Furthermore, the Court noted that Act No. 2874 specifically pertains to public lands. Once a homestead patent is issued and registered, the land is no longer considered public land but private property, subject to the general laws of conveyance, unless specific restrictions are imposed by law at the time of issuance or by the terms of the patent itself. The Court also referenced Section 194 of Act No. 2711 and the case of Garcia Sanchez vs. Rosauro (40 Phil., 231) in support of its decision that the demurrer should be overruled.
Main Doctrine
The prohibition against alienation or encumbrance of lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions under Act No. 2874 applies only to public lands and does not have retroactive effect. Therefore, it cannot apply to a homestead patent issued prior to the enactment of the said Act.