Adasa v. Abalos
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Cecille S. Abalos filed two complaints-affidavits against petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa for Estafa. Respondent alleged that petitioner deceitfully received and encashed two checks issued in respondent's name without her knowledge or consent. Despite repeated demands, petitioner allegedly failed to remit the proceeds of the checks. Procedural History: Initially, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City found probable cause against petitioner and ordered the filing of Informations for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Document. Two criminal cases were filed. Upon petitioner's motion, a reinvestigation was conducted, which affirmed the finding of probable cause. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which reversed the prosecutor's resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Information. Respondent moved for reconsideration, arguing the DOJ should not have taken cognizance of the petition due to petitioner's prior arraignment. The DOJ denied the motion. Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the criminal case based on the DOJ's resolution. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the DOJ's resolutions, finding that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to the petition after arraignment. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Petition: Petitioner Bernadette L. Adasa seeks review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, arguing that the DOJ did not err in entertaining her petition for review despite her prior arraignment. Petitioner contends that the relevant provisions of DOJ Circular No. 70 are permissive, that the contemporaneous construction by the DOJ should be given weight, and that the trial court's dismissal order rendered the case moot. Petitioner also argues that Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies only to original resolutions, not reinvestigations, and that her arraignment was void and did not constitute a waiver. Petitioner relies on cases such as Crespo v. Mogul, Roberts v. Court of Appeals, and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals to support her position that the DOJ retains the power to review cases even after arraignment.
Issue(s)
Whether the Department of Justice gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to petitioner’s petition for review despite the latter’s prior arraignment. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court’s order of dismissal rendered the petition moot and academic. Whether Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies to resolutions on reinvestigation. Whether the petitioner’s arraignment was null and void. Whether the petitioner’s arraignment constituted a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 21 July 2004 and its Resolution dated 10 June 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 76396 are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the grave abuse of discretion of the DOJ in giving due course to the petition for review despite prior arraignment: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the DOJ gravely abused its discretion. Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly states that if an information has been filed and the accused has already been arraigned, the petition for review shall not be given due course. The Court emphasized that the word "shall" in this provision is mandatory, indicating a prohibition. The arraignment of the petitioner prior to the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ meant that the DOJ should have dismissed the petition outright. The Court found petitioner's reliance on cases like Crespo v. Mogul, Roberts v. Court of Appeals, and Marcelo v. Court of Appeals misplaced, as these cases did not involve a situation where the appeal was filed after arraignment. The Court reiterated that when the law or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation is not necessary, and Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 is precisely such a provision. On whether the trial court’s order of dismissal rendered the petition moot and academic: The Court held that the issue was not rendered moot and academic. The trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the DOJ's resolutions, which were issued in grave abuse of discretion. Since the DOJ's resolutions were void, the subsequent order of dismissal by the trial court, which was based on these void resolutions, was also void. A void judgment is a complete nullity and has no legal effect, rendering all proceedings founded thereon invalid. Therefore, the respondent was not precluded from assailing the DOJ's action, even if the trial court had already dismissed the case. On whether Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 applies to resolutions on reinvestigation: The Court found this contention baseless. A reading of Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70 reveals no qualification limiting its application solely to appeals from original resolutions. The principle that "when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish" was applied, meaning the provision applies to all appeals, whether from original resolutions or resolutions on reinvestigation. On whether the petitioner’s arraignment was null and void: The Court found this contention without merit. The records showed that the arraignment was conducted without any restriction, condition, or reservation, and petitioner was assisted by her counsel. There was no evidence presented to substantiate the claim that the arraignment was improvidently conducted or forced upon her. On whether the petitioner’s arraignment constituted a waiver of her right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation: The Court affirmed that the settled rule is that when an accused pleads to the charge, they are deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity surrounding it. This precept applies to reinvestigations and reviews thereof. By unconditionally pleading to the charge, petitioner effectively waived her right to reinvestigation and the right to appeal its result to the DOJ Secretary. Consequently, with the arraignment, the DOJ Secretary could no longer entertain the appeal or petition for review because the petitioner had already waived or abandoned these rights. The Court also noted that under Rule 45, it cannot review factual issues like the existence or non-existence of probable cause, especially when the arraignment constitutes a waiver, which is tantamount to a finding of probable cause.
Main Doctrine
The Secretary of Justice is mandated to dismiss outright a petition for review filed before the Department of Justice if the accused has already been arraigned, as the arraignment constitutes a waiver of the right to preliminary investigation or reinvestigation and the right to question any irregularity surrounding it. The permissive language in Section 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70 does not override the mandatory prohibition in Section 7 when arraignment has already occurred.