Larrobis v. Wislizenus
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On May 24, 1919, Smith, Bell and Co., Ltd. filed an application to register land. On December 22, 1919, a general default order was entered against all persons except the Government of the Philippine Islands. On February 18, 1920, Canuto E. Larrobis filed a motion to set aside the default as to him and to be allowed to oppose the registration of a portion of the land. The trial judge granted this motion, and Larrobis' opposition was entered. Procedural History: On April 18, 1921, the applicant's attorneys moved to reconsider the order allowing Larrobis to oppose and to reinstate the default order against him. On June 15, 1921, this motion was granted, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration by Larrobis' attorney was denied. Larrobis was effectively excluded from the proceedings. The Petition: Larrobis filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, alleging that the respondent judge erred in reinstating the default order against him.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge erred in reinstating the default order against Canuto E. Larrobis. Whether the order of June 15, 1921, reinstating the default, constituted an irregular exercise of judicial power remediable by certiorari.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of certiorari. It vacated the order of June 15, 1921, and ordered that Canuto E. Larrobis be admitted to continue his opposition, unless the respondents interposed a sufficient answer within five days.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the respondent judge erred in reinstating the default order against Canuto E. Larrobis: The action of the court in reinstating the default order against Canuto E. Larrobis was clearly mistaken and due to a failure to discriminate between an interlocutory order declaring default and a final judgment based upon such default. The power of the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to set aside an interlocutory default order and permit a person to come in and make defense for good cause shown cannot be questioned. Such power is inherent in courts of general jurisdiction and may be exercised without statutory authority. Moreover, an interlocutory judgment or order remains under the control of the court until the final decision of the case and may be modified or rescinded on sufficient grounds shown at any time before the entry of final judgment. The ordinary interlocutory order declaring default is analogous to the taking of a bill pro confesso in courts of equity, which can be set aside upon timely application and reasonable showing of a meritorious defense and lack of culpable negligence. The court below undoubtedly had the power to entertain Larrobis' motion to set aside the default, and its action in granting that motion involved an exercise of discretion whose propriety could not be questioned. The proceedings had not yet reached the point where a final judgment could be entered, rendering the doctrine in Caballes vs. Director of Lands inapplicable. On the issue of whether the order of June 15, 1921, reinstating the default, constituted an irregular exercise of judicial power remediable by certiorari: The order of the respondent judge, dated June 15, 1921, making the default effective again against Canuto E. Larrobis was based upon a mistaken view of the law, specifically the erroneous belief that his previous order setting the default aside was void for want of jurisdiction. This being true, the making of the order of June 15, 1921, constituted an irregular exercise of judicial power, remediable by a petition for the writ of certiorari. After the original default had been set aside and Larrobis admitted to make opposition, he was on the same footing as any defendant party in an ordinary proceeding. Even conceding that the court might have reviewed the order setting aside the default for good cause shown, the action excluding the petitioner was clearly based on no other ground than a mistaken view of the law. Such an act must be treated as an irregular exercise of jurisdiction, as a Court of First Instance cannot eject a litigant from court without some legitimate basis.
Main Doctrine
An interlocutory order of default remains under the control of the court until final judgment and may be modified or rescinded on sufficient grounds. The power to set aside such an order is inherent in courts of general jurisdiction and is not limited by statutory provisions like Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially when the proceedings are still in fieri.