Domingo v. Landicho
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Crisologo C. Domingo filed an application for the registration of five parcels of land, totaling 38,975 square meters, located in Barangay Tolentino, Tagaytay. Domingo claimed to have purchased these lots from Genoveva Manlapit in 1948 and asserted continuous, open, public, adverse, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of an owner since then. He further alleged that Genoveva had been in possession of the lots in the same capacity for over 30 years prior to his purchase. The application was supported by a survey plan, technical descriptions, a geodetic engineer's certificate, tax declarations in Domingo's name dated January 7, 1993, and an indorsement recommending the approval of the survey plan. Procedural History: The Land Registration Authority (LRA) initially noted a discrepancy in the survey plan, which led the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to refer the matter for verification. The Director of Lands reported that the involved land was not covered by any land patent or pending public land application. Subsequently, the LRA filed a supplementary report indicating that after corrections were applied to the survey plan, no discrepancy remained. During the pendency of the application, respondents Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de Sagun, and Editha G. Sarmiento filed an Answer/Opposition, claiming their own possession and tax payments for the lots, and asserting that the survey plan was derived from a government cadastral survey. The RTC, by decision dated December 22, 1997, approved Domingo's application. The respondents appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC's ruling and dismissed Domingo's application, finding that he failed to prove possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and noting the absence of a deed of sale from Genoveva Manlapit. The Petition: Domingo, through his counsel, filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, faulting the Court of Appeals for limiting its consideration to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529, and for holding that he was not entitled to registration despite evidence establishing his entitlement under Section 14(1) and (4) of P.D. 1529. Domingo's counsel argued that even if possession since June 12, 1945, was not proven, registration was still warranted under Articles 1113 and 1137 of the Civil Code. The respondents, in their comment, prayed for the denial of the petition, citing procedural defects, including the failure to formally implead Domingo's heirs after his death on March 9, 1996, during the RTC proceedings. Domingo's counsel countered that the heirs' participation in the petition constituted a waiver and submitted Domingo's death certificate. The Supreme Court ultimately denied the petition, finding that Domingo failed to conclusively establish that the lots were alienable and disposable, and that he also failed to meet the required period of possession, noting the lack of a deed of sale and insufficient proof of possession since 1948, as well as issues with the tax declarations.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the RTC's decision and dismissing the application for land registration. Whether petitioner Crisologo C. Domingo and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lands under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier, as required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Whether petitioner is entitled to registration of title under Section 14(1) and (4) of P.D. No. 1529, or alternatively, under the Civil Code provisions on acquisitive prescription. Whether the proceedings and judgment of the RTC are null and void due to the failure to substitute the deceased applicant, Crisologo C. Domingo.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals' decision reversing and setting aside the RTC decision and dismissing Domingo's application for registration of land title is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Court of Appeals' decision: The Court reiterated that to be entitled to registration, the applicant must prove that the land is alienable and disposable. While a document labeled "2nd Indorsement" suggested the lots were within an alienable and disposable zone, its genuineness could not be ascertained as it was a mere photocopy, and the issuing inspector did not testify. Without incontrovertible evidence that the lots were declared alienable by the government, they are presumed to belong to the public domain and are not susceptible to private appropriation or acquisitive prescription. On the requirement of possession and occupation since June 12, 1945: Even assuming the lands were alienable, Domingo failed to comply with the period of possession. He alleged purchasing the lots in 1948 but failed to present the deed of sale or explain its absence. Furthermore, he did not prove that his predecessor-in-interest, Genoveva, acquired registrable title on or before June 12, 1945. His claim of possession since 1948 was a conclusion of law unsubstantiated by specific acts of ownership. The tax receipts presented were of recent vintage, with the earliest dated 1993. Tax declarations purportedly issued in 1947, 1964, and 1968 were problematic, as one indicated a subscription date of August 1, 1947, before his alleged purchase in 1948, and another mentioned P.D. No. 464, which took effect only in 1974. On the requirement of proving alienable and disposable lands: The Court found no basis for registration under Section 14(4) of P.D. No. 1529, which pertains to land acquired by prescription, as the requirement of proving alienable and disposable land was not met. On alternative claims under P.D. No. 1529 and the Civil Code: The claims under the Civil Code for acquisitive prescription were similarly unavailing due to the failure to establish the nature of the land as alienable and disposable and the required period of possession. On the effect of the applicant's death and conduct of counsel: The Court noted that Domingo died on March 9, 1996, during the pendency of his application before the RTC. His counsel failed to inform the RTC of his death and to cause the substitution of his legal representative or heirs, as required by Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Proceedings held and judgments rendered without proper substitution are null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the legal representative or heirs. However, the Court found that the surviving heirs voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by participating in the petition, thereby curing the defect, albeit belatedly. The Court addressed the failure of Domingo's former counsel, Atty. Irineo A. Anarna, to comply with the rules on substitution and his misrepresentation to the Court of Appeals regarding Domingo's status. The Court warned Atty. Anarna that repetition of such violations would be dealt with strictly, citing Canons 10 and Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Main Doctrine
An applicant for land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must conclusively prove that the land is alienable and disposable and that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership commenced on or before June 12, 1945. Failure to present the deed of sale or to adequately prove the sale, and the lack of proof of the predecessor's title from the required date, are fatal to the application. Furthermore, failure to comply with the rules on substitution of parties upon the death of an applicant renders subsequent proceedings and judgments void for lack of jurisdiction over the legal representatives or heirs.