Ormilla v. Director, Bureau of Corrections
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Rogelio Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera, and Alfredo Navarro were convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. Ormilla had served approximately 17 years of his sentence. Procedural History: Not applicable as this is a direct petition for habeas corpus. The Petition: Ormilla filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, praying for his release on the ground that the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him was excessive by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353 (The Anti-Rape Law of 1997). He argued that the new law downgraded the penalty for rape committed by two or more persons to prision mayor to reclusion temporal, and thus, he should be released to apply for pardon or parole.
Issue(s)
Whether the writ of habeas corpus may be granted in favor of petitioner Ormilla. Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on petitioner Ormilla is excessive under Republic Act No. 8353.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed and petitioner is confined under authority of law.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the writ of habeas corpus may be granted: The Court reiterated that a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of in cases of illegal confinement, deprivation of constitutional right, lack of jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or when an excessive penalty has been imposed, rendering the sentence void as to such excess. However, none of these circumstances were found to be present in the instant case. The petitioner was convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, which was the prescribed penalty at the time of the commission of the offense. The subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 8353 did not render the sentence void as to its excess because the petitioner had not yet served the minimum period of his sentence. On the issue of whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua is excessive under R.A. No. 8353: The Court clarified that the petitioner's reliance on a portion of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, was misplaced. The penalty of prision mayor cited by the petitioner applies to rape committed under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A, which pertains to sexual assault by inserting the penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument into the genital or anal orifice. The petitioner was convicted of rape by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation under Article 335, now embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A. Under Article 266-B, as amended, rape committed by two or more persons using force, threat, or intimidation is punished by reclusion perpetua to death. This penalty is the same as that imposed under Article 335 prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353. Therefore, R.A. No. 8353 did not downgrade the applicable penalties to the petitioner's case. Furthermore, the respondents correctly argued that the petitioner is ineligible for parole under Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as it prohibits its application to persons convicted of offenses punished by life imprisonment.
Main Doctrine
A writ of habeas corpus may be availed of when an excessive penalty has been imposed, rendering the sentence void as to such excess. However, where the penalty imposed is in accordance with law, even if subsequently amended by a new law, the writ will not prosper if the petitioner has not yet served the minimum period of the original sentence.