Don v. Lacsa
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners, public school teachers, filed administrative charges against respondent Ramon H. Lacsa, the Punong Barangay of Bacolod, Juban, Sorsogon, alleging grave threats, oppression, grave misconduct, and abuse of authority. A Special Investigating Committee (SIC) was formed by the Sangguniang Bayan to investigate these charges. The SIC found sufficient evidence to recommend the preventive suspension of the respondent, which was subsequently imposed by the mayor for two months. Following further investigation, the SIC submitted a report finding the respondent guilty of oppression, grave misconduct, and abuse of authority. The Sangguniang Bayan adopted this report and, by resolution, ordered the removal of the respondent from his position. Procedural History: Upon adoption of the Sangguniang Bayan's resolution removing him from office, the mayor issued an executive order implementing this decision and installing a replacement. Twenty-one days after receiving a copy of the resolution, the respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, challenging the executive order and the resolution. The RTC granted the petition, nullifying the mayor's executive order and ordering the respondent's reinstatement, along with payment of back emoluments. The trial court reasoned that the respondent was not properly afforded his right to appeal the Sangguniang Bayan's decision, as he was not given a copy of the resolution in a manner that would allow him to exercise his statutory appeal rights. After the RTC denied their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners brought the case before this Court. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the RTC's decision via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising solely questions of law. They contend that the trial court erred in finding that the respondent was deprived of his right to appeal, arguing that the resolution was provided to him to facilitate, not hinder, his appeal. They further argue that the mayor did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in executing the Sangguniang Bayan's resolution, and that the trial court improperly restored a right of administrative appeal that the respondent had allegedly abandoned. The petitioners assert that the RTC's decision overlooked provisions of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) regarding the finality and executory nature of decisions by the Sangguniang Bayan in administrative cases involving barangay officials, even pending appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in holding that the Sangguniang Bayan furnished respondent with a copy of its Resolution No. 12-2005 not to afford him his remedy of appeal, but to execute the said resolution hastily in violation of Section 66 of R.A. 7160, and whether the respondent had exhausted administrative remedies before filing a petition for certiorari. Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in holding that the respondent Municipal Mayor issued Executive Order No. 8 in "utmost" disregard of respondent’s right to due process, considering the 30-day appeal period under Section 67 of R.A. 7160. Whether the Regional Trial Court erred in holding that the municipal mayor, in promptly executing Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 12-2005, committed "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction," and whether the RTC's order effectively nullified the executory nature of the Sangguniang Bayan's decision. Whether the court a quo erred in restoring to respondent, through a writ of execution, the right of administrative appeal which he had abandoned and lost, considering the decision had already become executory.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 53. Resolution No. 12-2005 issued by the Juban, Sorsogon Sangguniang Bayan and Executive Order No. 8, Series of 2005 issued by Mayor Ma. Teresa Guab-Fragata were reinstated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of furnishing a copy of the resolution, due process, and exhaustion of remedies: The Court held that the RTC erred in its interpretation of Sections 66 and 67 of R.A. 7160. The phrase "final and executory" in Section 61(c) of the Local Government Code, as construed in Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr., means immediately executory, but does not preclude an appeal. The fact that the respondent received a copy of the resolution on March 8, 2005, and filed his petition for certiorari on March 29, 2005, meant he had not yet exhausted his remedy of appeal within the 30-day period provided by Section 67. Therefore, the conditions for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 were not met, as there was a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the issue of due process and the 30-day appeal period: The Court addressed whether the Municipal Mayor disregarded the respondent's right to due process by issuing Executive Order No. 8, considering the 30-day appeal period under Section 67 of R.A. 7160. (This ratio point directly addresses the second issue, elaborating on the due process considerations within the context of the appeal period.) On grave abuse of discretion and the executory nature of the decision: The Court found that the RTC erred in concluding that the mayor committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The mayor merely implemented the decision of the Sangguniang Bayan, which, under Section 61(c) of R.A. 7160, is final and executory. The RTC's order to reinstate respondent and allow him to appeal effectively nullified the executory nature of the Sangguniang Bayan's decision and the mayor's implementing order. On the restoration of appeal and the executory nature of the decision: The Court reiterated that Section 68 of R.A. 7160 clarifies that an appeal does not prevent a decision from being final and executory, and the respondent is considered under preventive suspension during the appeal. Thus, the RTC's restoration of the right to appeal, after the decision had already become executory and the period for appeal had commenced, was improper.
Main Doctrine
The phrase "final and executory" in Sections 61 and 67 of the Local Government Code (R.A. 7160) means that the decision is immediately executory, but does not preclude the right to appeal. An appeal does not prevent the enforcement of the decision.