Larena de Villanueva v. Rubio Viuda de Larena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Asuncion Larena de Villanueva, Maximiana Larena de Alviola, and Eustaquio Larena alleged they were natural children of the deceased Demetrio Larena and prayed to be declared coheirs. Procedural History: The trial court dismissed their petition. Asuncion Larena de Villanueva and Maximiana Larena de Alviola appealed. Only Asuncion Larena filed a brief. The Petition: Asuncion Larena, a natural daughter of Demetrio Larena, claimed her right to inherit as a coheir. She was born in 1880 and lived with her father, enjoying the status of a daughter, from childhood until before the Civil Code took effect in 1889. Demetrio Larena married Josefina Rubio in 1900 and had four legitimate children. Demetrio Larena died in 1916.
Issue(s)
Whether the appellant, as a natural child, lost her right to be acknowledged and to inherit due to the provisions of the Civil Code. Whether the appellant's right to inherit as a natural child prejudices the legitime of the legitimate children.
Ruling
The judgment appealed from is reversed. The appellant is declared the acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased Demetrio Larena with the right to participate in the inheritance under the provisions of the Civil Code. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the appellant lost her right to be acknowledged and to inherit due to the provisions of the Civil Code: The lower court erred in applying Article 1327 of the Civil Code. The appellant was born and enjoyed the status of a natural child through acts of acknowledgment by her father even before the Civil Code was in force in the Philippines. Under the law at that time (Law 11 of Toro), tacit acknowledgment by the father was sufficient to grant the status of a natural child, and such acknowledgment could be established by ordinary evidence without time limitations. This civil status, derived from her birth and her father's implied acknowledgment under former legislation, vested in the appellant a right that could not be impaired by the Civil Code. The transitory provisions of the Civil Code declare that changes introduced by it, when prejudicial to rights acquired under former legislation, shall regulate all rights arising under it, even if the Civil Code provides differently or does not recognize them. Therefore, the appellant's vested right as an acknowledged natural child under former law remains valid. On the issue of whether the appellant's right to inherit as a natural child prejudices the legitime of the legitimate children: The trial court erred in disallowing the appellant's participation in the inheritance based on Section 2 of the transitory provisions of the Civil Code. This provision states that if a right is declared for the first time in the Civil Code, it shall take effect even if its origin is under former legislation, provided no other right of the same origin arising under former legislation is prejudiced. The appellant's right to inherit as an acknowledged natural child is recognized by the Civil Code for the first time. However, the legitimate children's right to inheritance arose when the Civil Code was already in force. Their right did not originate from former legislation. Consequently, their right cannot annul the effects of the appellant's right to concur in the inheritance under the Civil Code. The case is distinguished from Rocha vs. Tuason and Rocah de Despujols, where the rights of both natural and legitimate sons originated from former legislation, making the exception in Section 2 of the transitory provisions applicable.
Main Doctrine
An acknowledged natural child's right to inherit, acquired under former legislation, cannot be impaired by the Civil Code, even if the Civil Code provides differently or does not recognize such rights, provided that the right acquired under former legislation is not prejudiced. Furthermore, if a right is declared for the first time in the Civil Code, it takes effect even if its origin is under former legislation, unless it prejudices another right acquired under the former legislation.