Cuunjieng v. Patstone
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: G.A. Cuunjieng sought a writ of mandamus to compel Fred L. Patstone, the city engineer of Manila, to issue a building permit for a warehouse on Azcarraga Street. The permit was denied because Cuunjieng refused to construct an arcade over the sidewalk in front of the proposed building and to pay a fee equivalent to one-half of the assessed value of the city land covered by the arcade, as required by Section 1 of Ordinance No. 301 of the City of Manila. Procedural History: The plaintiff refused to comply with the ordinance, arguing the arcade was unnecessary and unsuitable for his warehouse, and that the city lacked the power to require its construction or to exact such a fee, deeming the ordinance unconstitutional. The Court of First Instance ruled that the city had the power to require arcades but found the license fee prescribed by Ordinance No. 301 to be illegal. The Petition: The defendant appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance.
Issue(s)
Whether the question of the constitutionality of a city ordinance can be raised in a mandamus proceeding. Whether the City of Manila, under its charter, may exact a fee of one-half of the assessed value of the land covered by an arcade as a prerequisite for a building permit, under the guise of a license fee. Whether Ordinance No. 301 of the City of Manila is valid.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding that the city of Manila has the power to require the construction of arcades in certain circumstances but that the license fee prescribed by City Ordinance No. 301 is illegal, is hereby affirmed. No costs will be allowed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of raising constitutionality in mandamus: The Court held that the constitutionality of a statute or city ordinance may be raised by the petitioner in a mandamus proceeding, especially when there is no other adequate remedy. This differs from situations where the respondent relies on the unconstitutionality of a statute as a defense, as that could hinder public business if courts declined to consider such defenses. The Court found no principle preventing the consideration of constitutionality when attacked by the petitioner. On the City's power to exact the fee: The Court examined the legislative powers of the Municipal Board concerning taxes and licenses as enumerated in Sections 2444 and 2507 of the Administrative Code. It concluded that municipal corporations do not possess inherent powers of taxation or licensing; these must be expressly granted by statute. The Court found that the power to regulate the use of streets and sidewalks, as granted in Section 2444(u), does not inherently include the power to compel property holders to lease portions of public sidewalks or to exact fees for revenue beyond the costs of regulation and surveillance. On the validity of Ordinance No. 301 and the fee exacted: The Court analyzed the nature of license fees, distinguishing between those for regulation of useful occupations, regulation of non-useful occupations, and those for revenue only. It determined that the construction of buildings and arcades is a useful enterprise. Therefore, any license fee imposed should be limited to the expenses of issuing the license, inspection, and police surveillance. The fee of one-half of the assessed value of the land, which amounted to P525.60 compared to a normal fee of P31, was deemed excessive and clearly imposed for revenue purposes, not for regulation. The Court found no express legislative grant of power to the Municipal Board to impose such a license tax for revenue on building construction. Thus, the ordinance, in its exaction of this fee, exceeded the Municipal Board's powers and was deemed illegal.
Main Doctrine
A municipal ordinance that imposes a fee equivalent to one-half of the assessed value of city land for the use and occupation of a sidewalk for an arcade, beyond the actual costs of licensing, regulation, and surveillance, exceeds the municipality's taxing power and is therefore illegal, as it constitutes an exercise of the taxing power for revenue rather than the police power for regulation.