Mt. Carmel College v. Resuena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents Jocelyn Resuena, Eddie Villalon, Sylvia Sedayon, and Zonsayda Emnace, employees of petitioner Mt. Carmel College, participated in a protest action against the school administration. Petitioner issued memoranda requiring them to explain why they should not be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence, citing their positions of a confidential nature. After a fact-finding committee recommended dismissal, petitioner terminated respondents on May 15, 1998. Procedural History: Respondents filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, claiming 13th month pay, separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter (LA) initially affirmed the validity of the dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence but awarded separation pay, proportionate 13th month pay, and attorney's fees as equitable relief. The NLRC, on appeal, reversed the LA's decision, declaring the termination illegal and ordering reinstatement with backwages or separation pay in lieu thereof. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC's ruling, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The CA decision became final and executory on April 14, 2004. Subsequently, several writs of execution were issued by Labor Arbiter Pura for the collection of backwages and accrued salaries. Petitioner filed motions to quash these writs, arguing that backwages should only be computed up to May 25, 1999, and that the execution was improper. These motions were denied by the LA, the NLRC, and ultimately by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01615. The Petition: Petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision upholding the execution of the NLRC's judgment. Petitioner argued that the award of backwages should be limited to the period from May 15, 1998, to May 25, 1999, and that the continuing grant of backwages was contrary to law and jurisprudence. Petitioner also contended that reinstatement orders issued by the NLRC on appeal, unlike those from the LA, are not self-executory and require a writ of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the award of backwages should be limited to the period from May 15, 1998, to May 25, 1999, and whether the continuing grant and award of backwages up to the present is contrary to law and jurisprudence. Whether reinstatement orders issued by the NLRC on appeal are self-executory and do not require a writ of execution.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated June 2, 2006, is affirmed. Petitioner is ordered to reinstate respondents with backwages and accrued 13th month pay, or in lieu thereof, pay separation pay, backwages, and accrued 13th month pay. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for proper computation.
Ratio Decidendi
On the period of backwages and the continuing award of backwages: The Court reiterated that backwages are to be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement or payment of separation pay. The NLRC's ruling that respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered reinstatement with backwages from the time of dismissal until actual reinstatement was affirmed. The Court clarified that the dispositive portion of the NLRC decision, which mentioned the period up to May 25, 1999, was modified by the body of the decision and the subsequent affirmation by the Court of Appeals, which clearly stated reinstatement with backwages until actual reinstatement. The Court emphasized that Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates backwages from the time compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Court found the petitioner's argument that backwages should be limited to the period prior to the appeal to be absurd. The NLRC's decision clearly ordered reinstatement with backwages from the time of illegal dismissal up to the time of actual reinstatement. The Court stressed that litigation must end, and the winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict through subterfuge. The continuing accumulation of backwages is a consequence of the employer's failure to implement the reinstatement aspect of the judgment. On the self-executory nature of reinstatement orders: The Court clarified that Article 223 of the Labor Code, which makes reinstatement orders immediately executory even pending appeal, applies only when the Labor Arbiter himself orders reinstatement. In this case, reinstatement was ordered by the NLRC on appeal. Therefore, Article 224 of the Labor Code, which requires a writ of execution for the enforcement of judgments, applies. The Court noted that while a writ of execution is necessary for enforcement, this did not negate the respondents' entitlement to backwages until actual reinstatement or payment of separation pay.
Main Doctrine
Backwages for illegally dismissed employees are to be computed from the time of illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement or payment of separation pay, and the execution of reinstatement orders, even if issued by the NLRC on appeal, requires a writ of execution under Article 224 of the Labor Code, not Article 223.