Buencamino v. Court of Appeals
ABANDONMENTFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Constantino Pascual filed an administrative complaint against petitioner Edmundo Jose T. Buencamino, then mayor of San Miguel, Bulacan, for grave misconduct, abuse of authority, acts unbecoming of a public officer, and violation of R.A. No. 3019. Pascual alleged that Buencamino illegally demanded a "pass way" fee of ₱1,000.00 per delivery truck without an official receipt, purportedly pursuant to a municipal ordinance. Buencamino claimed the fee was imposed under Kapasiyahan Blg. 89A-055. Pascual countered that the ordinance was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Bulacan for being ultra vires, as the Local Government Code of 1991 does not empower municipalities to tax delivery trucks of mining companies passing through their jurisdiction. Procedural History: The Office of the Ombudsman found Buencamino administratively liable for abuse of authority and suspended him for six months without pay. Buencamino appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Ombudsman's decision. The CA issued a TRO but later denied the application for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently denied his motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the CA in denying his application for a preliminary injunction. He argued that the Ombudsman's decision was not immediately executory under Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, citing several cases, and that the Ombudsman violated Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 and jurisprudence. The Ombudsman countered that the CA did not gravely abuse its discretion and that the cited cases were overturned by subsequent rulings, particularly regarding the executory nature of Ombudsman decisions pending appeal due to amendments to Administrative Order No. 07.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction. Whether the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner from office is immediately executory pending appeal.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition. It held that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for injunctive relief because decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's application for a preliminary injunction: The Court held that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner's argument hinged on the interpretation of Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, which, at the time of the Ombudsman's decision, was interpreted to mean that decisions imposing penalties other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month's salary, become final and executory only after the period to appeal has lapsed or after the denial of the appeal. However, the Court pointed out that this provision was amended by Administrative Order No. 17. The amended Section 7 explicitly states that "An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory" and that "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course." This amendment, which aligns with the constitutional authority of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of procedure, renders the petitioner's reliance on the old interpretation misplaced. Therefore, the CA's denial of the injunction, which would have prevented the execution of the Ombudsman's decision, was a proper exercise of its discretion based on the prevailing rules. On the issue of whether the Decision of the Office of the Ombudsman suspending petitioner from office is immediately executory pending appeal: The Court affirmed that the decision is immediately executory. The crucial point of contention was the executory nature of the Ombudsman's decision pending appeal. Petitioner relied on Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 and cited cases like Laja and Lopez, which suggested that decisions imposing penalties beyond minor sanctions were not immediately executory. However, the Ombudsman correctly pointed out that Administrative Order No. 07 was amended by Administrative Order No. 17. The amended rule clearly states that "An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory" and that "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course." This amendment effectively overturned the prior interpretation that allowed for a stay of execution pending appeal for more severe penalties. The Supreme Court reiterated the Ombudsman's power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, as granted by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, making Administrative Order No. 17 a valid and controlling rule. Consequently, the Ombudsman's decision suspending the petitioner was immediately executory, and the CA's refusal to grant an injunction against its execution was legally sound.
Main Doctrine
Decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases are immediately executory pending appeal, even if the penalty imposed is suspension, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 17, which amended Administrative Order No. 07. An appeal does not stop the decision from being executory.