People v. Serna
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Nida and Francisca Alejo, along with the People of the Philippines, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus seeking to nullify an order issued by respondent Judge Erlinda Pestaño-Buted of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Palayan City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1316-P and 1317-P. The original Informations charged Arthur Serna and Jong Linsangan, among others, with kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery. Subsequently, an Information was amended to charge robbery with double homicide based on the testimony of a suspected gang member, Miguel De la Cruz, who claimed to have witnessed the victims' detention and subsequent killing, identified other John Does, and applied for the Witness Protection Program. Procedural History: Arthur Serna and Jong Linsangan pleaded not guilty after arrest. Petitioners requested a venue transfer due to safety concerns, but the respondent judge did not act on the motion for suspension of proceedings. Private respondents filed a motion for bail. Miguel De la Cruz, while in protective custody for illegal possession of firearms, revealed details of the kidnapping and murder and agreed to testify. The respondent judge ordered De la Cruz's release from custody despite objections, citing lack of warrant, that he was not a prosecution witness, and that he posted bail in his own case. Petitioners then filed a Motion to Inhibit the respondent judge, citing several grounds including the judge's handling of De la Cruz's release, her expressed dismay at PNP officers, her continuation of proceedings despite a pending venue transfer request, and her alleged violation of rules in releasing another accused, Elias Mingoy. The respondent judge denied the motion to inhibit. The Petition: Petitioners are before the Supreme Court, contending that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act on their Motion to Inhibit. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent judge had retired from the service before the resolution of the petition.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the petitioners' Motion to Inhibit. Whether the petition has become moot and academic.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for being moot and academic. The Supreme Court noted that the respondent judge had retired from the service before the resolution of the petition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the Motion to Inhibit: The Court reiterated the principles governing the disqualification of judges under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, distinguishing between compulsory and voluntary inhibition. It emphasized that while judges have discretion in voluntary inhibition, this discretion must be exercised for just and valid causes, particularly when circumstances reasonably incite bias or prejudice, to maintain public faith in the judiciary. The Court cited the Salonga doctrine, stating that a judge should exercise discretion to ensure that people's faith in courts is not impaired. Given the prosecution's apparent lack of faith in the respondent judge and the grounds cited in the motion to inhibit, which included the judge's handling of a potential witness's release and continuation of proceedings despite a pending venue transfer request, the Court found that the respondent judge should have inhibited herself. The Court noted that the grounds specified by the movants were meritorious and that the prosecution's lack of faith placed the judge in a difficult position where any decision could be perceived as biased, which is detrimental to the integrity of the judicial system. The Court concluded that the judge's refusal to inhibit, under these circumstances, constituted grave abuse of discretion. On the issue of mootness: The Court found the petition to have become moot and academic because the respondent judge had retired from the service on January 7, 2006, prior to the resolution of the present petition. When a judge retires, the issue of their inhibition from a particular case becomes moot as they are no longer presiding over the court.
Main Doctrine
A judge who refuses to inhibit himself despite grounds that cast doubt on his impartiality, thereby impairing public faith in the judiciary, commits grave abuse of discretion. However, if the judge retires before the resolution of the petition, the case becomes moot.