Collantes v. Marcelo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Virgilio Cervantes owned two parcels of land, a portion of which was taken by the government in the 1970s for the Marikina-Infanta Road (Marcos Highway). Cervantes did not demand or receive just compensation and remained the registered owner until 1999. In 1998, Cervantes sold the lands to R.J. Pamintuan Furnishing Corporation (RJ Pamintuan), which subsequently claimed just compensation for the affected portion. The claim was referred to DPWH Regional Director Salvador Pleyto, who requested the Rizal Provincial Appraisal Committee (R-PAC), including petitioner Danilo Collantes, to fix the property's market value. R-PAC fixed the market value at P606.66 per square meter, suggesting a total fair market value between P19,752,697.93 and P21,181,612.50. Subsequently, RJ Pamintuan, represented by Teresita Pamintuan, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Pleyto, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Quitclaim for 14,761 square meters at P982.54 per square meter, totaling P14,503,272.94, with Pamintuan waiving rights on the remaining portion. A complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman alleging an anomalous transaction. Procedural History: The Ombudsman conducted a fact-finding investigation. Initially, a Joint Resolution recommended filing an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. However, this was set aside, and a provisional dismissal was recommended due to insufficient evidence of actual payment. The case was referred back to the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) for further investigation. After further investigation, the FFIB revived the cases. Collantes, along with other R-PAC members, moved for dismissal, arguing they merely acted on Pleyto's request to fix the market value and had no hand in the contract's execution. A Graft Investigator recommended dismissal, but this was disapproved by the Assistant Ombudsman, who found probable cause and recommended filing an Information against Pleyto, Baraquero, Collantes, Rodenas, and Teresita Fabian-Pamintuan for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. This recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman. A Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by Baraquero, Collantes, and Rodenas was denied by the Ombudsman in a Supplemental Order. The Petition: Petitioner Danilo Collantes filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the Ombudsman's Memorandum recommending the filing of an Information and its Supplemental Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. He argued that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to the lack of probable cause against him.
Issue(s)
Whether the public respondent gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he recommended the filing of an Information against the petitioner for alleged violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act despite lack of probable cause against him. Whether the public respondent gravely abused his discretion when he failed to reconsider the Memorandum dated May 11, 2004, despite compelling reasons for the reversal thereof.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The Memorandum of the Office of the Ombudsman dated May 11, 2004, and its Supplemental Order dated December 14, 2004, are reversed and set aside insofar as Danilo Collantes is concerned. The proceedings against the other accused shall continue without delay.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Grave Abuse of Discretion and Lack of Probable Cause: The Court reiterated that while the determination of probable cause is primarily the Ombudsman's function, courts may intervene via certiorari if the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion occurs when power is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or despotically, amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a legal duty. The Ombudsman abuses discretion when essential facts are not considered in determining probable cause. The Court has consistently issued writs of certiorari to protect constitutional rights, ensure orderly administration of justice, avoid oppression, and when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused. This issue also encompasses the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The offense requires that the accused be a public officer discharging official functions, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, and that such action caused undue injury to any party or gave unwarranted benefits to a private party. The Court emphasized that mere bad faith or partiality is insufficient; the act must be evident or manifest, and the negligence must be gross and inexcusable. Crucially, these modalities must result in undue injury or unwarranted benefits. On the Issue of Failure to Reconsider and Petitioner's Role/Good Faith: The Court found that the Ombudsman erred in concluding that petitioner acted with evident bad faith based solely on the allegedly high appraisal. It highlighted that the Provincial Appraisal Committee's (PAC) power, as established by Executive Order No. 132, is merely recommendatory. The PAC ascertains the market value when mutual agreement fails, but its recommendation is subject to review by the property owner and the government agency. The State, represented by DPWH, had the obligation to object to an appraisal it deemed erroneous, particularly if based on the wrong valuation period (current market value instead of the time of taking). The Court stressed that the R-PAC's appraisal was not conclusive. DPWH Department Order No. 520, Series of 1998, states that the committee's determination serves as a basis for negotiation, but it can still be objected to by the property owner or set aside by a court. The Appraisal Report itself stated that the appraised value was not final and controlling, and the DPWH was expected to evaluate it. Therefore, the petitioner's function was merely recommendatory, and he had no control over the final consummation of the transaction. The Court reiterated the presumption of good faith in the performance of official duties. Bad faith requires more than just a moral judgment or negligence; it involves a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity, conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of duty with ill will or furtive design. The Court found no evidence of such intent or ill will on the part of the petitioner. Furthermore, imputing bad faith based on an assumption that the petitioner was a "willing partner" in a conspiracy was rejected, citing the need for proof, not mere conjectures, to establish conspiracy. The act of appraising properties, when the appraisal is recommendatory and not conclusive, cannot be considered an overt act in furtherance of a common design to defraud.
Main Doctrine
The determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation is a function belonging to the Office of the Ombudsman. However, courts may interfere when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. For a public officer to be charged under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, it must be shown that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence, and that such action caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits. A mere erroneous appraisal, especially when its function is merely recommendatory and subject to review, does not automatically constitute evident bad faith.