Brito v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents Sandy P. Padilla and Monico A. Dingal, Jr., employees of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples-Region IV (NCIP-Region IV), were tasked as members of a Field-Based Investigation (FBI) team. This team investigates the impact of proposed projects on indigenous peoples' ancestral domains to determine the issuance of a Certification Precondition. According to NCIP Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1998, the cost of these investigations is to be shouldered by the applicant company. In 2001, Padilla and Dingal conducted investigations for Kumakata Mining Dev. Corp., La Concepcion Dev. Corp., and Rio Tuba Nickel Corp. Following these investigations, Padilla requested reimbursement from petitioner Dr. Ulysses A. Brito, OIC-Regional Director of NCIP Region IV, for per diems and taxi fares, stating the companies had not provided these. Petitioner approved the reimbursement of P3,240.00 to each respondent. Subsequently, the companies issued certifications indicating they had already paid allowances to Padilla and Dingal, totaling P3,900.00 each, though these did not include per diems and taxi fares according to affidavits from Rio Tuba and La Concepcion. Procedural History: Convinced that the respondents' actions constituted penal and administrative violations, petitioner Brito filed a complaint-affidavit charging them with Estafa thru Falsification and violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (anti-graft law), docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0581-E and OMB-L-C-03-1374-K. An administrative case for Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest was also filed, docketed as OMB-L-A-03-1059-K. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon initially recommended dismissal of both cases, deeming them premature and suggesting exhaustion of administrative remedies. Upon petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint Order dated December 7, 2004. This order found the respondents liable for violating Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, imposing a penalty of reprimand, but dismissed the criminal charges. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 167335 & 167337) questioning the dismissal of the criminal aspect. He also elevated the administrative aspect to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 65, which was dismissed for being the wrong remedy; the Court of Appeals held that appeals in administrative cases from the Ombudsman should be under Rule 43. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 173152) assailing the Court of Appeals' dismissal. The two sets of petitions were consolidated. The Petition: In G.R. Nos. 167335 & 167337, petitioner seeks a reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman's Joint Order dated December 7, 2004, specifically the dismissal of the criminal cases, arguing grave abuse of discretion for failing to find probable cause for Estafa thru Falsification and violation of RA 3019. In G.R. No. 173152, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' Resolution dated October 18, 2005, which dismissed his petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner contends that the administrative penalty of reprimand imposed by the Ombudsman is final and unappealable, thus his recourse to the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 was proper, and that the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in not finding gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to public interest. The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition as appeals from Ombudsman decisions in administrative cases fall under Rule 43, and that the provisions cited by petitioner regarding finality of reprimand penalties were declared unconstitutional in Fabian v. Desierto, except for the finality aspect itself. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that petitioner employed the wrong remedy in G.R. No. 173152 by filing with the Court of Appeals instead of directly with the Supreme Court via certiorari, and even if treated as such, no grave abuse of discretion was shown. For G.R. Nos. 167335 & 167337, the Court held that the determination of probable cause is within the Ombudsman's discretion and not subject to review via certiorari unless there is grave abuse of discretion, which was not demonstrated.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing petitioner's special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, considering the finality of the Ombudsman's decisions and the proper recourse for alleged grave abuse of discretion. Whether the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal cases against private respondents, particularly regarding the determination of probable cause and the Supreme Court's role in reviewing factual findings. Whether the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon committed grave abuse of discretion in finding private respondents liable only for a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6713 and imposing a penalty of reprimand, instead of finding them guilty of Gross Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Public Interest, considering the evidence presented and the basis for the Deputy Ombudsman's findings.
Ruling
The petitions are dismissed. The assailed Joint Order of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dated December 7, 2004, is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the remedy and the finality of the Ombudsman's decision: The Court reiterated that decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary, or a fine equivalent to one month's salary, are final and unappealable as provided under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The ruling in Fabian v. Desierto only invalidated the provision allowing appeals to the Supreme Court in administrative disciplinary cases, designating the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 as the proper forum for such appeals. However, the finality of decisions imposing minor penalties remains. Therefore, the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman imposing a reprimand was final and unappealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. Petitioner's recourse for alleged grave abuse of discretion should have been a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed directly with the Supreme Court, not with the Court of Appeals. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal cases: The Court held that the determination of probable cause is primarily the function of the Office of the Ombudsman. Absent grave abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court generally adopts a policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the Deputy Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal charges. The Court emphasized that it is not a trier of facts, and the Ombudsman is vested with this power. The issues presented by the petitioner touched upon factual findings, which are not reviewable by certiorari. On the alleged grave abuse of discretion in the administrative aspect: The Court found that the Deputy Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its findings. The evidence did not support the charges of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the public interest. The private respondents' claim for reimbursements for per diems and taxi fares was based on their belief that these were not included in the allowances they received from the companies, a belief substantiated by affidavits from the companies. Therefore, the Deputy Ombudsman correctly concluded that the private respondents could not be held liable for gross dishonesty. However, they were found liable for failing to uphold public interest over personal interest and for inefficient use of public resources, as mandated by Section 4(a) of Republic Act No. 6713, which warranted the penalty of reprimand. The Deputy Ombudsman's joint order was based on substantial evidence, and there was no reason for the Supreme Court to void it.
Main Doctrine
Decisions of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of reprimand are final and unappealable. However, such decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court via certiorari under Rule 65 if there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Appeals from other Ombudsman decisions in administrative disciplinary cases should be filed with the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.