Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans (Committee) was created to investigate loans granted at the behest of government officials. The Committee investigated loan transactions between Agretronics, Incorporated (Agretronics) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), finding them to possess characteristics of a behest loan. These characteristics included being undercollateralized, the borrower being undercapitalized, direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, deviation of loan proceeds, use of corporate layering, non-feasibility of the project, and extraordinary speed in loan release. Procedural History: The Committee filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against Angel G. Romualdez, Jose G. Romualdez, and Jose Manuel Romualdez for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint, citing lack of probable cause and prescription of the offense. The Ombudsman reasoned that the alleged extraordinary speed was not supported by evidence, the loan was not grossly disadvantageous to the government due to safety measures and collateral, and there was no evidence of bad faith, partiality, or negligence. The Ombudsman also concluded that the offense had prescribed based on the 10-year prescriptive period applicable to offenses committed in 1980. The Petition: The Committee filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the Ombudsman's Resolution for grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction. The Committee prayed for the reversal of the Resolution and an order directing the Ombudsman to file the necessary information against the private respondents.
Issue(s)
Whether or not public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction in holding that there was no cause to proceed against any of the private respondents; and if the extraordinary speed of loan approval, the existence of sufficient collateral, and the classification of respondents as cronies are matters best left for trial. Whether or not public respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted in excess of jurisdiction in holding that the offense had already prescribed.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is ORDERED to file in the proper court the necessary information against private respondents Angel G. Romualdez, Jose G. Romualdez and Jose Manuel Romualdez.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and lack of probable cause: The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in finding a lack of probable cause. Preliminary investigation is not the venue for a full display of evidence; its purpose is to establish a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty. The Court found that questions regarding the extraordinary speed of loan approval, the existence of sufficient collateral, and the classification of respondents as cronies are matters best left for trial. The Court emphasized that the Committee, composed of experts from various financial institutions, is in a better position to determine the behest nature of the loan and whether standard banking practices were followed. The resulting damage to the government, evidenced by the substantial difference between the total obligation and the amount realized from foreclosure, was deemed clear and sufficient to establish probable cause. Probable cause requires more than bare suspicion but less than evidence for conviction, implying a probability of guilt. On the issue of prescription of the offense: The Supreme Court ruled that the offense charged had not prescribed. The Court reiterated its ruling in previous cases involving behest loans that the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, especially those committed prior to the EDSA Revolution, should be computed from the date of discovery of the offense, not from the date of commission, due to the difficulty in discovering such violations at the time they were made. In this case, the violation was deemed discovered on June 14, 1996, the date of filing the complaint with the Ombudsman after an exhaustive investigation by the Committee. The filing of the complaint for preliminary investigation tolls the running of the prescriptive period, thus, there was no legal obstacle to filing the information.
Main Doctrine
The Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of R.A. No. 3019 due to lack of probable cause and prescription, as the evidence presented warranted a full-blown trial to determine the behest nature of the loan and the existence of damage to the government, and the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the discovery of the offense.