City Engineer of Baguio v. Baniqued
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute arose when Generoso Bonifacio, acting as attorney-in-fact for property owners, filed a complaint with the Baguio City Mayor's Office seeking the demolition of a house belonging to spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. The City Engineer's Office had previously determined that the structures were built in 1999 without a building permit, violating P.D. 1096 and potentially R.A. 7279, and recommended demolition. Consequently, on May 19, 1999, then-City Mayor Mauricio Domogan issued a Notice of Demolition against the Baniqueds, ordering them to voluntarily remove their structures within seven days or face demolition at their expense. Procedural History: Aggrieved by the notice, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with a temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, alleging the demolition was pursued without due process. The RTC initially issued a TRO but later granted the City Engineer and Mayor Domogan's motion to dismiss, finding the Mayor's actions were not judicial or quasi-judicial and that Baniqued failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Baniqued appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC's dismissal, holding that the Mayor exercises quasi-judicial functions and that Baniqued's complaint stated a cause of action. The CA recalled the RTC's orders and directed the denial of the motion to dismiss. Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied, leading to the present appeal. The Petition: Petitioners Leo Bernardez, Jr. and Mauricio Domogan question the CA's Decision and Resolution, contending that the CA erred in ruling the City Mayor's act of issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function, that Baniqued's prohibition action was proper, and in reversing the RTC's decision. They argue that Baniqued incorrectly availed himself of prohibition, asserting the Mayor's act was purely executive and that Baniqued failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention. They also argue Baniqued did not allege the act was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in ruling that the act of the City Mayor in issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in ruling that the action of prohibition filed by Baniqued with the trial court is proper under the circumstances, including the exhaustion of administrative remedies and the distinction between a notice of demolition and a demolition order. Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in reversing the decision of the trial court, considering the requirement of alleging lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that the petition is unmeritorious. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the quasi-judicial function of the Mayor: The Court affirmed the CA's ruling that the Mayor, while performing executive functions, also exercises quasi-judicial functions when determining property rights and issuing demolition notices or orders. The Court quoted the CA's observation that the Mayor's office is endowed with the authority to hear issues involving property rights, which necessitates the exercise of quasi-judicial powers. The definition of quasi-judicial function from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary was cited, emphasizing the investigation of facts, holding of hearings, drawing conclusions, and exercising discretion of a judicial nature as a basis for official action. On the propriety of the remedy of prohibition and exhaustion of administrative remedies: The Court held that prohibition was correctly availed of by Baniqued. Prohibition is a writ that prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising jurisdiction not vested in them by law, or from exceeding their jurisdiction. Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure allows prohibition when proceedings are without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court emphasized that the writ is used to prevent tribunals or officers from exceeding their legal powers. The Court reiterated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which requires parties to avail of all administrative processes before seeking judicial intervention. However, it clarified that this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule and admits of exceptions. The Court cited several exceptions, including when there is an urgent need for judicial intervention, when irreparable damage will be suffered, when the act complained of is patently illegal, or when there was a violation of due process. In this case, the Court found that there was an urgent need for judicial intervention because the notice of demolition was clear, and a motion for reconsideration would likely be denied, rendering it a useless exercise. Furthermore, the demolition of Baniqued's house would cause irreparable damage. The Court found the distinction between a notice of demolition and an order of demolition to be immaterial. What was material was that Baniqued felt threatened by the impending demolition of his house. The Court reasoned that it would have been too late and illogical for him to wait until his house was actually demolished before seeking judicial protection. Acting at the earliest opportunity and availing of the best remedy available was deemed the prudent course of action. On the requirement of alleging lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the complaint for prohibition was fatally defective for failing to specifically allege lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The Court clarified that while such allegations are generally required, a reading of the complaint's allegations could lead to the conclusion that the act complained of was indeed done without or in excess of jurisdiction. The Court cited Reyes v. Romero but distinguished it, stating that the better interpretation is that the absence of a specific allegation does not automatically cause dismissal if the facts alleged clearly indicate a jurisdictional excess or abuse.
Main Doctrine
A petition for prohibition is a proper remedy to question the issuance of a notice of demolition, even if it is not a final demolition order, when there is an urgent need for judicial intervention due to the threat of irreparable damage and the potential for the act to be patently illegal or violative of due process. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies admits of exceptions, including situations where the administrative process would be a useless exercise or where irreparable harm would result.