Verde v. Macapagal
REVERSALFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents, as pro-indiviso owners, inherited a 2.5-hectare land. Petitioner, Celso Verde, was the leasehold tenant, succeeding his father. On July 14, 1995, respondents filed an ejectment case against petitioner, alleging that petitioner mortgaged the land to Aurelio dela Cruz in 1993, who then cultivated one-half of the property. Petitioner purportedly admitted this, begged for forgiveness, and vowed not to mortgage it again. However, dela Cruz continued cultivating the land in 1994. Respondents argued this constituted abandonment, a ground for termination of the agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844. Procedural History: The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) initially ruled in favor of petitioner. The Court of Appeals reversed this, finding abandonment. The Supreme Court, in a prior decision dated June 23, 2005, reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the PARAD's ruling, holding that hiring dela Cruz for his carabao did not constitute abandonment. The Petition: Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Court erred in giving weight to dela Cruz's affidavit, not giving probative value to their witnesses' affidavits, and consequently erring in finding that petitioner did not relinquish personal cultivation and abandon his tenancy.
Issue(s)
Whether the affidavits of petitioner's witnesses should be relied upon given their non-appearance for clarificatory questions. Whether petitioner's act of mortgaging the subject landholding to dela Cruz constituted abandonment, thereby extinguishing the tenancy relationship.
Ruling
The Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 62736 promulgated on December 18, 2001, is REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of relying on affidavits and non-appearance for clarificatory questions: The Court reiterated that proceedings before the Department of Agrarian Reform are summary in nature and not bound by strict technical rules of procedure and evidence. Due process requires only an opportunity to explain one's side, which the parties had by submitting pleadings and supporting affidavits. The failure of the PARAD to ask clarificatory questions was a procedural lapse that did not deprive it of jurisdiction. Furthermore, respondents had opportunities to request hearings for clarificatory questions, but they ultimately manifested their consent to the resolution of their motion for reconsideration instead of insisting on further hearings, thereby waiving this procedural argument. On the issue of abandonment and extinguishment of tenancy: The Court ruled in favor of respondents, finding that petitioner had indeed abandoned the landholding. To prove abandonment, respondents must show a clear and absolute intention to renounce the right or property, coupled with an external act expressing this intention. The Court found that petitioner's assertions of continuous possession and cultivation were weakened by inconsistencies. Initially, he claimed dela Cruz was a hired helper for his carabao. Later, before the Court of Appeals, he admitted allowing dela Cruz to possess and cultivate the land as payment for a personal loan, which significantly corroborated respondents' allegations. This stark inconsistency demonstrated a desperate attempt to justify dela Cruz's possession and cultivation, establishing that petitioner surrendered possession and cultivation to a third party for at least two years. The Court emphasized that personal cultivation is a requisite for tenancy, and a tenant may employ farm laborers for occasional tasks but cannot leave the entire process of cultivation to hired helpers. By surrendering possession and cultivation to dela Cruz, petitioner failed to meet the requirement of personal cultivation, which is glaringly wanting in this case, warranting the conclusion that the tenancy relationship had been severed. This act of leaving the landholding to a third party amounts to abandonment and the eventual termination of the tenancy relationship.
Main Doctrine
The act of a tenant in allowing a third party to possess and cultivate the landholding, even if initially justified as a means to repay a loan, constitutes abandonment of the tenancy relationship if the tenant ceases personal cultivation for an extended period, thereby severing the essential element of personal cultivation required for tenancy.