Fabillo v. Tionko
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellee Florencio Fabillo filed a complaint against defendants-appellants Eusebio Tionko and Luis Egay. The complaint was filed on August 11, 1920, and the answer on August 20, 1920. Procedural History: The initial trial on September 8, 1920, proceeded with the plaintiff's evidence without the defendants' presence. Defendant Tionko moved for annulment, claiming lack of notice, which the trial judge granted despite evidence of proper notice. Amended pleadings were subsequently filed. The case was reset for trial on April 25, 1921. Defendant Egay requested postponement due to sickness, and Tionko requested postponement until July due to his attendance at the House of Representatives. The judge ordered the case called on April 30, 1921. Defendants again requested postponement via telegram: Egay due to sickness and Tionko due to the Independence Mission session. The judge refused further continuance and rendered judgment against the defendants. The Petition: Appellants contended that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying their request for a continuance and in not granting their motion for a new trial, praying for reversal and a new trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the defendants-appellants' motions for continuance and for a new trial.
Ruling
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. The defendants are condemned to return thirty-eight posts described in the complaint or jointly and severally reimburse the plaintiff in the sum of P480, and to pay P150 as additional damages, with costs against them.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motions for continuance. The Court reiterated the general rule that the granting or refusing of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts will not interfere unless the trial court's action is clearly erroneous or constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. In this case, the Court found that both Judges Mariano and Borromeo had been exceedingly patient with the defendants, who appeared to be employing delaying tactics in the administration of justice. The Court specifically addressed defendant Egay's excuse of sickness, noting that his only showing was a brief telegram, which is insufficient. Applying the rule from Natividad vs. Marquez (1981, 38 Phil., 608), the Court emphasized that illness must be established by a satisfactory sworn statement, such as an affidavit or a physician's certificate, to satisfy the court of a party's inability to be present. Regarding defendant Tionko's reliance on his attendance at the session of the Independence Mission as a ground for postponement, the Court ruled that the absence of counsel attending the Legislature as a member is not a sufficient cause for continuance unless specifically provided by statute. The Court reasoned that Tionko could have arranged for the handling of his cases in provincial courts during his absence, concluding that the wheels of justice cannot stop for legislative meetings.
Main Doctrine
The granting or refusing of a motion for continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be interfered with unless it is clearly erroneous or a clear abuse of discretion. Absence of counsel due to legislative duties is not a sufficient cause for continuance unless provided by statute. Illness must be established by satisfactory sworn statement.