Soriano v. Marcelo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Hilario P. Soriano filed a criminal and administrative complaint against Leoncia R. Dimagiba, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila, for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner alleged that Dimagiba showed manifest partiality by recommending the reopening of a preliminary investigation for falsification of public document against Mely Palad, to whom petitioner had filed the original complaint. Petitioner claimed Dimagiba had previously recommended the approval of the Resolution and Information against Palad, and summarily recommended reopening the case six months later, anchoring it on "the interest of justice" without sufficient basis. Procedural History: Dimagiba denied the allegations in her Counter-Affidavit. Graft Investigation Officer I Jennifer A. Agustin-Se submitted a Resolution dated October 22, 2002, recommending the dismissal of the complaint, which was approved by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on June 4, 2003. The Resolution found insufficient evidence to establish manifest partiality or evident bad faith. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit and being filed out of time in an Order dated November 17, 2003, approved by the Deputy Ombudsman. Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner sought to reverse the Ombudsman's Resolution and Order, alleging that the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing his complaint against Dimagiba and denying his motion for reconsideration.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner's complaint against Dimagiba. Whether the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, specifically concerning the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Issue of Grave Abuse of Discretion by the Ombudsman: The Supreme Court reiterated that certiorari is a remedy for errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. It emphasized that the Court does not re-examine or re-evaluate evidence in a certiorari proceeding. The Ombudsman has broad investigatory and prosecutory powers, and the Court consistently refrains from interfering unless the Ombudsman's rulings are unsupported by substantial evidence or tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic exercise of judgment. In this case, the Court found no capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment by the respondents. The dismissal of the complaint was based on the finding that there was insufficient evidence to establish probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court noted that Dimagiba's recommendation to reopen the preliminary investigation was based on the absence of proof of Palad's receipt of the subpoena, which she perceived as a deficiency affecting due process. Her intention was to correct a procedural flaw and expedite the case, not to give unwarranted benefits. The Court found her explanation for reopening the case to be reasonable and not indicative of manifest partiality or evident bad faith. The principle of regularity in the performance of official functions was applied in favor of Dimagiba. On the Elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court restated the elements: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging official functions; (2) the officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; and (3) the action caused undue injury or gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. It stressed that mere bad faith or partiality is insufficient; the act must be manifest or evident, and the negligence gross and inexcusable. Furthermore, these modalities must result in undue injury or unwarranted benefits. The Court found that the petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of good faith in favor of Dimagiba. There was no clear showing that she was motivated by self-interest, ill will, or ulterior motives. Her decision to reopen the preliminary investigation was sufficiently explained as an effort to correct a procedural deficiency and prevent further delays, consistent with the purpose of preliminary investigations to protect the innocent from hasty and oppressive prosecution and to ensure efficient disposition of cases.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of investigatory and prosecutory powers if the rulings are supported by substantial evidence, unless the exercise of such powers is tainted by grave abuse of discretion, which implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.