Acebedo Optical Shops v. Santiago
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Rodrigo C. Santiago was hired as an accountant by petitioners MP Acebedo Optical Shops/Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. and was later promoted to Chief Accountant for the Acebedo Group of Companies. During his employment, Santiago took a leave of absence. Upon requesting an extension, he was informed by the Human Resources Department that his services were no longer needed and that he would be dismissed effective April 9, 1997. Santiago subsequently filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, unpaid salaries and allowances, 13th month pay, per diem, unremitted SSS and Pag-Ibig Fund contributions, and withheld taxes. Petitioners contended that Santiago was dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence, citing discovered shortcomings in his performance and unauthorized printing and distribution of accountable documents. Procedural History: The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on April 30, 1998, ordering petitioners to reinstate Santiago to his former position with full backwages, while dismissing his other monetary claims. Petitioners appealed this decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). However, the NLRC dismissed their appeal on March 31, 2000, on the grounds that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the NLRC's resolution. The Court of Appeals, in a decision dated April 16, 2002, dismissed the petition, affirming the NLRC's ruling. Petitioners' subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the Court of Appeals on August 4, 2004. The Petition: Petitioners seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, arguing that the appellate court committed grave errors in affirming the NLRC's dismissal of their appeal and in upholding the finding of illegal dismissal and the order for backwages. They contend that the NLRC should have entertained their appeal and reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The core issue presented to this Court is whether petitioners' appeal to the NLRC was perfected within the reglementary period. Petitioners claim their former counsel failed to receive the Labor Arbiter's decision, leading to the delayed filing, while respondents maintain that the appeal was indeed filed out of time and that no question of law is raised. Petitioners are filing this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the NLRC's dismissal of petitioners' appeal, considering the timeliness of the appeal to the NLRC and the petitioners' diligence in monitoring their case. Whether petitioners' appeal to the NLRC was perfected within the reglementary period. Whether the termination of respondent was illegal.
Ruling
The petition is denied for utter lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the perfection of appeal and the alleged grave abuse of discretion: The Court reiterated the well-entrenched doctrine that the right to appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised in compliance with the applicable statutes or rules. The NLRC Rules, having the force and effect of law, prescribe the time within which acts must be done, and failure to comply renders the judgment final and executory. Petitioners' contention that their former counsel did not receive the Labor Arbiter's Decision is misleading, as records confirmed receipt by their counsel on July 20, 1998. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands, as petitioners presented no evidence to overcome it. Consequently, they had ten calendar days from July 20, 1998, or until July 30, 1998, to appeal. The memorandum of appeal filed on June 17, 1999, was thus "very much belated" and the appeal was "definitely filed out of time." The Court emphasized that while it may, in highly meritorious cases, opt to sidestep strict rules on reglementary periods to prevent grave injustice, such an exception does not obtain here. Furthermore, the Court noted that party-litigants have a duty to be in contact with their counsel to be informed of the progress of their case, a duty petitioners manifestly failed to discharge by not displaying the expected degree of concern or attention to their case. Therefore, the NLRC correctly dismissed the appeal, and the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion in affirming this dismissal. On the perfection of appeal and the alleged grave abuse of discretion: The Court reiterated the well-entrenched doctrine that the right to appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised in compliance with the applicable statutes or rules. The NLRC Rules, having the force and effect of law, prescribe the time within which acts must be done, and failure to comply renders the judgment final and executory. Petitioners' contention that their former counsel did not receive the Labor Arbiter's Decision is misleading, as records confirmed receipt by their counsel on July 20, 1998. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands, as petitioners presented no evidence to overcome it. Consequently, they had ten calendar days from July 20, 1998, or until July 30, 1998, to appeal. The memorandum of appeal filed on June 17, 1999, was thus "very much belated" and the appeal was "definitely filed out of time." There was no ratio provided for the issue of illegal termination.
Main Doctrine
The right to appeal is a statutory right that must be exercised within the reglementary period prescribed by law. Failure to perfect an appeal within the said period renders the judgment final and executory. While exceptions exist, they are applied only in highly meritorious cases to prevent grave injustice, and not merely due to the negligence of counsel or the litigant's failure to monitor their case.