People of the Philippines v. Monge
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Barangay tanods Serdan and Molina apprehended petitioner Galo Monge and Edgar Potencio in possession of three pieces of mahogany lumber in Barangay Santo Domingo, Iriga City. They were unable to produce the required permit or authority from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner fled the scene, while Potencio was brought to the police station and later to the DENR-CENRO, where a seizure receipt was issued for the lumber, valued at P1,925.00. Procedural History: An information was filed charging petitioner and Potencio with violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277. Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The testimony of Serdan was stricken out for failure to appear for cross-examination. Potencio was discharged as a state witness. Potencio testified that petitioner owned the lumber and hired him to haul it. Molina corroborated Potencio's testimony. Petitioner claimed Potencio owned the lumber and hired him to transport it to a sawmill. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found petitioner guilty. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, reiterating his challenge against Potencio's discharge. The Petition: Petitioner assails the CA's affirmation of his conviction and the discharge of Potencio as a state witness, arguing that Potencio was not the least guilty and his testimony was not absolutely necessary.
Issue(s)
Whether the discharge of Edgar Potencio as a state witness was proper. Whether petitioner Galo Monge is guilty of violating Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the discharge of Edgar Potencio as a state witness: The discharge of an accused to become a state witness is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The determination of who is the least guilty and the necessity of the testimony are factual issues within the trial court's domain. Appellate courts will not interfere except in cases of grave abuse of discretion, which was not present here. Furthermore, issues regarding the discharge of an accused must be raised in the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. An order of discharge has the effect of an acquittal, and any error in granting it does not deprive the discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and protection against double jeopardy, unless the discharged witness fails to testify truthfully. On the guilt of petitioner Galo Monge: Petitioner and Potencio were caught in flagrante delicto possessing mahogany lumber without the requisite DENR permit. Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, penalizes both the unauthorized cutting, gathering, collecting, and removing of forest products, and the possession of such products without legal documents. DENR Administrative Order No. 59, series of 1993, requires a certificate of lumber origin for the transport of lumber. The crime is consummated by mere possession of forest products without the requisite documents, irrespective of the legality of the cutting or ownership. Petitioner's claim that he was merely hired by Potencio and that Potencio owned the lumber is unavailing because P.D. No. 705 is a special penal statute punishing acts that are malum prohibitum. Claims of good faith or lack of criminal intent are not valid defenses as the offense is complete upon commission of the prohibited act. The direct testimony of Molina and Potencio, corroborated by the seizure receipt, established petitioner's liability.
Main Doctrine
Mere possession of timber or other forest products without the proper legal documents, even absent malice or criminal intent, is illegal under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277. The discharge of an accused as a state witness is a matter of sound discretion of the trial court and is not subject to appellate interference except in cases of grave abuse of discretion.