People v. Abare
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On November 24, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, in Barangay Bucayao, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, the victim, Samson Cuyogan, was at the house of Armando Yabut for a birthday celebration. While seated with his back turned towards the window, engaged in conversation with Yabut and others, the victim suddenly fell forward with blood oozing from his neck. At that instant, the accused, Marcelino Abare, was seen standing outside the window holding a bloodied scythe. Yabut approached Abare, who stated, "Amanos na kami, solved na ang problema ko." Yabut then disarmed Abare and the victim was brought to the hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The victim sustained a fatal hack wound on the neck. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calapan City found Marcelino Abare guilty of murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision. The Petition: The accused-appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that his guilt for murder was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, specifically questioning the presence of treachery, and asserting that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated.
Issue(s)
Whether the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, particularly the presence of treachery. Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated, and if so, whether it would alter the imposable penalty.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding the accused-appellant Marcelino Abare guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was affirmed, with modifications as to the damages awarded. The accused-appellant was ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of murder has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, particularly the presence of treachery: The Court held that treachery was present. Although the witnesses did not directly see the hacking, they saw the victim suddenly fall forward with a bloodied neck, and at that precise moment, the accused was seen standing outside the window, behind the victim, holding a bloodied scythe. This circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish that the accused committed the act. The Court distinguished the present case from People v. Lug-aw, where the eyewitness did not witness the commencement of the attack. In this case, the victim was seated with his back turned, affording him no opportunity to defend himself, and the attack was sudden and unexpected. The defense that the accused acted on impulse after a dispute over wages was found to be unbelievable, especially since the witnesses testified that no altercation transpired prior to the incident. The Court reiterated that treachery requires that the victim be not in a position to defend himself and that the offender consciously adopted the means of attack, both of which were satisfied. On the issue of whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated, and if so, whether it would alter the imposable penalty: The Court found that even if voluntary surrender were appreciated, it would not alter the imposable penalty. The crime of murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are indivisible penalties. According to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and there are mitigating circumstances but no aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In this case, even with a mitigating circumstance, the penalty would still be reclusion perpetua. Therefore, the appreciation of voluntary surrender was rendered immaterial to the penalty imposed.
Main Doctrine
Treachery may be appreciated even if the attack was not directly witnessed, provided that the circumstances surrounding the incident clearly indicate that the victim was afforded no opportunity to defend himself and the offender consciously adopted the means of attack. The defense of having acted on impulse due to a perceived grievance is unavailing when the victim's actions do not constitute sufficient provocation and the attack was sudden and from behind.