Go v. Leyte II Electric Cooperative
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Jeffrey T. Go purchased a property from Rosita Mancera. On February 13, 2006, an inspection team from respondent Leyte II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (LEYECO II) inspected the electric meter at petitioner's residence. The inspection, witnessed by Barangay Chairman Jesus Alex Alusa and SPO3 Glen Trinidad, revealed a broken seal and a shunting wire at the back of the meter. On March 7, 2006, petitioner received a "Notice of Apprehension and Disconnection" assessing him P101,597.99 for pilferage differential billing and surcharges, with a ten-day period to settle, otherwise his service would be disconnected. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a "Petition for Injunction and Damages with Preliminary Injunction with a Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order" before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, alleging an irregular and illegal inspection and no legal basis for disconnection. The RTC issued a 72-hour TRO, later extended to 20 days, and subsequently granted a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond equivalent to the differential billing. The RTC denied LEYECO II's motion for reconsideration. LEYECO II filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed and set aside the RTC orders, finding that petitioner failed to substantiate allegations of bad faith and that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting the injunction. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: Petitioner claims LEYECO II failed to comply with R.A. No. 7832 during the inspection, that he was not caught in flagrante delicto, and that the injunction was proper due to his filing of a bond. LEYECO II contends the inspection satisfied legal requirements, petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto, and an injunction requires prima facie evidence of evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority.
Issue(s)
Whether the inspection of petitioner's electric meter was in accordance with R.A. No. 7832. Whether petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto. Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Court of Appeals' decision, and reinstated the Regional Trial Court's orders granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the inspection of petitioner's electric meter was in accordance with R.A. No. 7832: The Court held that the inspection was conducted in accordance with Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832. While petitioner argued that the presence of a barangay chairman was insufficient as an "officer of the law," the Court clarified that Section 112 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7832 defines an officer of the law broadly to include a barangay chairman. Furthermore, the records showed that SPO3 Glen Trinidad also witnessed the inspection and signed the Notice of Apprehension and Disconnection, satisfying the requirement that the discovery must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative. On whether petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto: The Court ruled that petitioner was not caught in flagrante delicto. The principle of in flagrante delicto requires positive identification by eyewitnesses, meaning the person was caught in the very act of committing the crime. Since petitioner was not present during the inspection, nor were any of his representatives, he could not have been caught in the act. The presence of a broken seal and a shunting wire, while constituting prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7832, does not equate to being caught in flagrante delicto under Section 6 of the same law, which allows for immediate disconnection only when the consumer is caught in the act. On whether the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued against respondent LEYECO II: The Court found that the writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued. It clarified that Section 9 of R.A. No. 7832, as well as Rule VIII of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, provides two instances for the issuance of an injunction or restraining order against an electric utility: (1) when there is prima facie evidence that the disconnection was made with evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority; and (2) when the electric consumer deposits a bond with the court in the form of cash or cashier's check equivalent to the differential billing, penalties, and other charges. In this case, petitioner complied with the second condition by filing a bond equivalent to the assessed differential billing. The Court emphasized that this provision protects both the consumer and the utility, as the bond safeguards the utility's interest while allowing the consumer to seek recourse. The Court also noted that the utility has a remedy against such injunctions by filing a counterbond.
Main Doctrine
A writ of preliminary injunction against an electric utility for disconnection of service may be issued not only when there is prima facie evidence of evident bad faith or grave abuse of authority, but also when the electric consumer deposits a bond equivalent to the differential billing, penalties, and other charges, as this protects the utility's interest while safeguarding the consumer's right.