Hernal v. De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent spouses Paulino de Guzman, Jr. and Ana Dizon-de Guzman filed a complaint for legal redemption with damages against petitioner spouses Manalo P. Hernal, Jr. and Mildred Villaroman-Hernal. The respondents alleged that they were co-owners of several parcels of land, a portion of which was sold by the other co-owners to the petitioners without the respondents' knowledge. In their supplemental complaint, the respondents alleged a tender of payment to the petitioners, which the petitioners refused. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) initially granted the petitioners' motion to dismiss for the respondents' alleged failure to tender payment within the statutory period. The respondents moved for reconsideration, but it was denied for lacking a notice of hearing. Subsequently, the respondents filed a notice of appeal, which the RTC also denied, deeming it filed beyond the reglementary period because the prior motion for reconsideration, lacking a notice of hearing, was considered a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the appeal period. The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC's denial of their appeal. The CA granted the petition, ruling that the appeal period should have commenced from the date the respondents' counsel received the RTC resolution, not from the respondents' own receipt. The Petition: The petitioners, spouses Manalo P. Hernal, Jr. and Mildred Villaroman-Hernal, seek review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. They challenge the CA's decision and resolution, arguing that the CA erred in holding that the period for the respondent spouses to appeal commenced only from their counsel's receipt of the RTC resolution. The petitioners contend that the respondents' counsel had actual notice of the RTC resolution, evidenced by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, rendering the CA's reliance on the date of formal notice erroneous.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the period for respondent spouses to appeal commenced only from their counsel's receipt of the first RTC resolution on May 15, 2003, despite prior actual notice. Whether the reglementary period to appeal should commence from the date of actual notice to the party or their counsel, notwithstanding the lack of formal notice, and the effect of filing a motion for reconsideration acknowledging the resolution.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The September 21, 2007 decision and January 24, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 3, 2003 and August 20, 2003 resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 29, denying the notice of appeal are REINSTATED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the commencement of the reglementary period to appeal: The Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the period for appeal should have commenced from the date respondents' counsel received a copy of the first RTC resolution on May 15, 2003. The Court reiterated the principle that while formal service of judgment is necessary as a rule, it is not always the reckoning point for the reglementary period to appeal. The established jurisprudence, as cited in Santiago v. Guadiz, states that the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice. This principle is rooted in due process, preventing parties from feigning ignorance of a decision they are aware of. On the effect of actual notice and the motion for reconsideration: The Court found that the respondents' counsel had actual notice of the first RTC resolution. This was evidenced by his act of filing a motion for reconsideration on May 8, 2003, wherein he explicitly stated that he received a copy of the resolution on April 23, 2003, and acknowledged its contents by arguing against the dismissal. Such an act constituted an admission of awareness of the resolution's existence and content. Therefore, it was irrelevant that he received a copy of the resolution only on May 15, 2003, as the reglementary period for appeal should have been reckoned from the date of actual notice, which was prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the notice of appeal filed on May 27, 2003, was indeed filed out of time.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration that lacks a notice of hearing is considered a mere scrap of paper and does not toll the reglementary period for appeal. However, where the counsel of record has actual notice of the resolution, as evidenced by the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the lack of formal notice cannot prevail against the fact of actual notice, and the reglementary period for appeal commences from the date of actual notice.