Esteves v. Sarmiento
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves and private respondent Reynaldo Teh Bitong ran for Mayor of Casiguran, Aurora. Private respondent was proclaimed winner with a margin of 48 votes. Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which issued a precautionary protection order. Private respondent filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing the protest was defective for not specifying precincts with fraud. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Procedural History: Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division, seeking to nullify the RTC's denial of his motion to dismiss and to dismiss the election protest. The COMELEC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from taking cognizance of the case and to lift the TRO. The Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's action for failure to comply with procedural requirements. The Petition: The COMELEC (Second Division) issued a resolution nullifying the RTC's order and dismissing the election protest. Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer penned the resolution, with Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissenting. Hence, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition before the Supreme Court, assailing the COMELEC resolution on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, non-compliance with majority vote requirement, and negation of the purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
Issue(s)
Whether the COMELEC (Second Division) has jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for certiorari and prohibition. Whether the challenged resolution complied with the constitutional requirement of a majority vote of all COMELEC members. Whether the challenged resolution negated the spirit and purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, considering the prematurity of the petition.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The Supreme Court held that the COMELEC (Second Division) has jurisdiction to entertain such petitions, but the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition was premature due to the failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Second Division) to entertain special relief cases: The Court affirmed that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two divisions and promulgate rules of procedure. All election cases are heard and decided in division, but motions for reconsideration of decisions are decided by the Commission en banc. Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders, or rulings of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari within thirty days from receipt. This implies that the COMELEC, in its divisions, can issue rulings that are subject to further review within the COMELEC itself. On the compliance with the majority vote requirement: The Court noted that the COMELEC en banc is composed of three members. While Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. had retired before the resolution was issued, the assailed resolution was penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, with Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissenting. The Court did not explicitly rule on whether this constituted a majority vote of all members, but the subsequent discussion on the procedural defect rendered this issue moot. On whether the challenged resolution negated the spirit and purpose of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the prematurity of the petition: The Court emphasized that under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution and established jurisprudence, the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional before a party can elevate a resolution of a COMELEC Division to the Supreme Court via certiorari. Failure to do so constitutes a ground for dismissal. The Court cited Ambil v. Commission on Elections to stress that the Supreme Court's power of review is limited to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not its divisions. The rationale is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to rectify its errors. Since the petitioner did not allege filing a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, the petition was premature, violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The premature invocation of judicial intervention is fatal to a cause of action.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing a resolution of a COMELEC Division must first be filed with the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration, as failure to exhaust administrative remedies renders the petition premature and grounds for dismissal.