People v. Dizon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The defendant, Ambrosio Dizon, was accused of homicide for allegedly attacking Saturnino Ramirez with a pocket-knife on December 27, 1921, in Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. The attack, apparently without provocation or known motive, resulted in wounds that caused Ramirez's death the following day. Procedural History: The trial court found the defendant guilty of homicide and sentenced him to fourteen years, one month, and one day of reclusion temporal, with indemnity to the heirs and costs. The defendant appealed the decision. The Petition: The defendant appealed, raising several assignments of error, including the legality of the information signed by a designated fiscal, the participation of a private prosecutor, and the admissibility of the deceased's dying declaration.
Issue(s)
Whether the information was validly signed by a provincial fiscal designated to act in another province. Whether the participation of a private prosecutor in the trial was irregular. Whether the dying declaration of the deceased was admissible in evidence.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding the defendant guilty of homicide. The sentence imposed by the lower court was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the information: The Court presumed the designation of the provincial fiscal was legal, absent any evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, the fiscal was considered a de facto officer, having acted as such with the acquiescence of the court and the public. On the participation of a private prosecutor: The Court held that allowing a private prosecutor to conduct the trial is not objectionable, provided the fiscal retains control of the prosecution and assumes full responsibility. There was no evidence to show that the fiscal did not maintain such control in this case. On the admissibility of the dying declaration: The Court acknowledged that the written dying declaration (Exhibit A) was inadmissible on its face because it was not read to or signed by the deceased. However, the error was deemed immaterial because the justice of the peace, before whom the declaration was made, testified and related the deceased's oral statements. These oral statements were admissible as a dying declaration. The deceased's consciousness of impending dissolution was evident from the extreme seriousness of his wound, his statements that he was dying, and the fact that death occurred shortly thereafter.
Main Doctrine
A written dying declaration, if not read by or to the declarant and not signed or recognized by him, is generally inadmissible. However, oral statements made by the deceased under the solemn conviction of approaching dissolution are admissible as dying declarations, even if not reduced to writing.