Lichauco & Company v. Apostol
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Lichauco & Company, Inc. (petitioner) sought to import draft cattle and bovine cattle from French Indo-China for serum manufacture. The Director of Agriculture refused admission unless the cattle were immunized from rinderpest prior to embarkation, as per Administrative Order No. 21. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an original petition for writs of mandamus and injunction, seeking to compel respondents (Director of Agriculture and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) to admit the importation and to enjoin the enforcement of Administrative Order No. 21. The Petition: Petitioner asserted an absolute right to import under the proviso of Section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052, arguing respondents had no authority to impose the immunization condition. Respondents relied on Section 1770 of the Administrative Code and Administrative Order No. 21.
Issue(s)
Whether Section 1770 of the Administrative Code, concerning prohibition against bringing animals from infected foreign countries, was impliedly repealed by Act No. 3052, which amended Section 1762 of the Administrative Code, specifically the proviso allowing importation of draft and bovine cattle for serum manufacture. Whether the requirement of pre-embarkation immunization for cattle imported for serum manufacture, as stipulated in Administrative Order No. 21, is an unreasonable restriction that this Court can review.
Ruling
The petition was denied. The demurrer of the respondents was sustained, and the temporary restraining order was dissolved. The Court held that Section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force and effect, and the administrative order requiring immunization is valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of implied repeal: The Court held that Section 1770 of the Administrative Code was not impliedly repealed by Act No. 3052. The Court reasoned that Section 1762, as amended, is general in nature, while Section 1770 deals with a specific contingency – the prevalence of dangerous communicable animal diseases in foreign countries. Therefore, Section 1770 must be treated as a special qualification of Section 1762, and the general rule is that the general must yield to the particular. The Court cited numerous precedents establishing that a general statute does not repeal a prior special statute by implication unless there is a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy, which was not present here. The Court emphasized that repeals by implication are not favored and that both statutes could stand together harmoniously, with Section 1770 acting as an exception to the general provisions of Section 1762. On the reasonableness of the immunization requirement: The Court found that considerations regarding the reasonableness of the immunization requirement were matters for the administrative authorities responsible for the regulations, not for the judiciary. The Court noted that the existence of rinderpest in the specified regions was undisputed, and the Department Head acted within his province in declaring the danger and issuing the order. The Court also clarified that the requirement of prior immunization was a condition precedent to the right to import, not an undue restriction on the importer's liberty, as the importer was free to take the necessary measures to gain admittance for his cattle.
Main Doctrine
A general statute does not repeal a prior special statute by implication, even if the general statute, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would include the matter covered by the special statute. The special statute must be considered an exception to the general statute.