Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee v. Desierto
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns allegations of violations of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Sections 3(e) and (g). These charges stem from loan transactions involving Golden Country Farms, Inc. (GCFI) with the National Investment Development Corporation (NIDC) and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), created to investigate such loans, concluded that GCFI's loan transactions bore the hallmarks of behest loans, including being undercollateralized, the borrower being undercapitalized, direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials, and extraordinary speed in loan release. The Committee identified ten individuals, officers and board members of NIDC and DBP, and stockholders and officers of GCFI, as potentially liable. Procedural History: Following the Committee's investigation and conclusion that GCFI's loans were behest loans, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, a PCGG consultant and representative of the Committee, filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against ten individuals. The Ombudsman, by Resolution dated August 19, 1998, dismissed the complaint, finding insufficient evidence to warrant indictment and that the alleged offenses had prescribed. The Ombudsman reasoned that the government did not suffer clear damage as GCFI's management and operations had been taken over by DBP and NIDC since August 1980, and that the offenses had prescribed as the complaint was filed over twenty years after the loan transactions in 1975-1976. The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans challenged this dismissal. The Petition: The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans filed a petition for review on certiorari, later treated as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, arguing that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion. The Committee contended that the government did suffer damage, that the right to recover ill-gotten wealth is imprescriptible under the 1987 Constitution, and that even if subject to prescription, the period should be counted from the discovery of the loans in 1992. The Committee also argued that the Ombudsman erred in dismissing the case based on insufficient evidence, asserting that the expertise of the Committee should be given great weight and that conflicting claims regarding capitalization, collateral, and loan terms should be resolved in a full trial. The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Ombudsman's resolution and ordering the filing of necessary informations against the respondents, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr., who had transactional immunity.
Issue(s)
Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Whether the offenses charged under Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019 have prescribed, including a determination of the elements required for each violation. Whether there is probable cause to file an information against the respondents for violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, and the extent of the Ombudsman's discretion in determining probable cause.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's Resolution, and ordered the Ombudsman to file the necessary information against the respondents, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr. due to transactional immunity.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court reiterated its ruling in Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans v. Hon. Desierto and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Desierto, holding that the prescriptive period for offenses involving behest loans should be computed from the discovery of the commission of the offense, not from the date of commission. This is because the government, as the aggrieved party, could not have known of the violations at the time the transactions were made due to connivance. Therefore, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced in 1992 when the Committee was constituted and conducted its investigation. The complaint was filed in 1997, approximately five years later, thus prescription had not yet set in. On the issue of insufficiency of evidence and probable cause: The Court found that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The Court emphasized that a preliminary investigation is not the venue for a full display of evidence, but only for establishing probable cause. The conflicting accounts presented by the Committee and the spouses Romualdez regarding GCFI's capitalization, collateral, and the nature of the loans should be resolved in a full-blown trial. The Court also highlighted the expertise of the Committee, which was specifically created to determine behest loans, and stated that its findings should be given great weight. On the elements of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019: The Court clarified that a Section 3(e) violation requires undue injury and unwarranted benefits, while a Section 3(g) violation requires a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The Court noted that the Ombudsman's resolution failed to distinguish between pre-takeover and post-takeover transactions and seemed to consider the takeover as a cure for all alleged violations. The Court pointed out that even after the takeover, a violation of Section 3(g) could still exist if the transactions were disadvantageous to the government. The Court found that the unpaid loan at the time of takeover should have been sufficient basis for a finding of injury to the government for Section 3(e) charges, and that Section 3(g) violations could still arise from post-takeover transactions. On the issue of probable cause and the Ombudsman's discretion: While the Court generally respects the Ombudsman's discretion in determining probable cause, this rule does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion. The Court found such abuse in the Ombudsman's dismissal of the complaint, particularly in his misapplication of the law on prescription and his failure to properly assess the evidence in light of the Committee's findings and established jurisprudence. The Court reiterated that a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime was committed and was committed by the suspects. Applying this standard, the Court found sufficient probable cause to bind the respondents over for trial, except for Placido L. Mapa, Jr. who was granted transactional immunity.
Main Doctrine
The prescriptive period for offenses involving the acquisition of behest loans should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof, not from the day of commission, especially when the government, as the aggrieved party, could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were made due to connivance or conspiracy. The Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the complaint solely on the ground of prescription and insufficiency of evidence without considering the established jurisprudence on the computation of prescriptive periods for behest loans and the nature of preliminary investigation.