Pontejos v. Desierto

G.R. No. 148600 · 2009-07-07 · J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: · Primary: Ethics; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a case before the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB) concerning Rasemco, Inc. versus Hammercon, Inc. During this proceeding, Rasemco, represented by Restituto Aquino, filed a notice of appeal alleging extortion, bribery, and graft and corruption by Arbiter Emmanuel Pontejos, along with other HLURB officials and an officer of Hammercon, Inc. The allegations included demands for money in exchange for favorable decisions, improper issuance of a license to sell, assistance in preparing legal documents for Rasemco, and clandestine meetings. Procedural History: Following the notice of appeal and a complaint-affidavit filed by Aquino, the HLURB initiated an investigation. Simultaneously, Aquino filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman's office conducted a preliminary investigation, leading to the issuance of a joint resolution recommending the filing of criminal informations for estafa and direct bribery against Arbiter Pontejos, and for unauthorized practice of profession. The Ombudsman also recommended dismissal of charges against other officials and granted immunity to Carmencita Atos. Subsequently, the Ombudsman issued an order finding Arbiter Pontejos guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing him from service. Pontejos appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the Ombudsman's ruling. He then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioner Atty. Emmanuel Pontejos seeks, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to annul the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. He argues that he was denied due process by the Office of the Ombudsman, that the proceedings were tainted with ill motives, that the grant of immunity to Carmencita Atos was improper, that he was singled out for preventive suspension, that the CA erred in giving weight to Atos' affidavit, and that there was a failure to prosecute by the private respondent. The Supreme Court noted that these issues were substantially the same as those raised in a previous case involving the same parties and facts, concerning the Ombudsman's resolution recommending criminal charges.

Issue(s)

Whether petitioner was denied due process by the Office of the Ombudsman. Whether the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman were tainted with ill motives. Whether the grant of immunity to Ms. Carmencita R. Atos was improper. Whether the Office of the Ombudsman singled out petitioner for preventive suspension. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in giving weight to the affidavit of Ms. Atos. Whether there was a failure to prosecute on the part of the private respondent. Whether petitioner is guilty of grave misconduct and if the penalty of dismissal is proper.

Ruling

The petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

Ratio Decidendi

On the denial of due process: The Court held that due process in administrative proceedings requires an opportunity to be heard, which is satisfied by the chance to explain one's side or seek reconsideration. Petitioner had ample opportunity to ventilate his case, submitting a counter-affidavit, seeking reconsideration of his preventive suspension, and appealing to the CA. His motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's decision cured any alleged defect. The absence of the complainant, Aquino, in two hearings did not constitute a denial of due process, as administrative bodies are not bound by strict procedural rules and a fair opportunity to explain one's side suffices. The Court also noted that in administrative cases, the complainant is a mere witness, and the offense is against the government, thus the complainant's absence in hearings is not a ground for dismissal. On the proceedings being tainted with ill motives: The Court found no proof of ill motives or conspiracy, citing a previous case involving the same parties and facts. Petitioner's claims were characterized as conjectures bereft of evidence, with no showing of interference by Commissioner Desierto or any grudge against petitioner. The Court reiterated that the decision to prosecute and grant immunity is an executive function, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate grave abuse of discretion in the granting of immunity to Atos. On the grant of immunity to Ms. Carmencita R. Atos: The Court affirmed the Ombudsman's power to grant immunity from criminal prosecution under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act), which allows granting immunity to a person whose testimony is necessary to determine the truth. While Section 17 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of an accused as a state witness applies to cases already filed in court, the power to choose who to discharge as a state witness is an executive function. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman's decision to grant immunity to Atos, considering her position, record, and involvement in the case prior to the discharge. On the singling out for preventive suspension: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the preventive suspension of petitioner. The decision to suspend was based on the findings of probable cause, and petitioner had the opportunity to challenge this through a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. The Court reiterated that the decision to prosecute and the extent of investigation are within the executive discretion of the Ombudsman. On giving weight to Ms. Atos's affidavit: The Court found that petitioner had the opportunity to challenge Ms. Atos's affidavit, as he was furnished a copy and raised objections in his motion for reinvestigation and request for reconsideration. Therefore, his right to due process was not violated. The Court also noted that the Ombudsman considered Atos's position, record, and involvement in the case prior to granting her immunity. On failure to prosecute: The Court ruled that the absence of Aquino in two hearings did not constitute a failure to prosecute warranting dismissal. The Court clarified that while Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court on dismissal due to the plaintiff's fault can be applied suppletorily, the real test is whether the plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence. Aquino had appeared at a clarificatory hearing and brought petitioner's misconduct to the authorities' attention. Furthermore, in administrative cases, the complainant is a mere witness, and the offense is against the government, making the complainant's absence in hearings not a ground for dismissal. On petitioner's guilt for grave misconduct and the penalty of dismissal: The Court affirmed the Ombudsman's finding of grave misconduct, supported by substantial evidence. It was established that petitioner demanded and received ₱100,000.00 for a favorable decision. The statements of witnesses Atos, Adel, and Atty. Venturanza were clear, categorical, and detailed, corroborating Aquino's allegations. Petitioner's bare denial was insufficient to overcome this evidence. Grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal from service under civil service rules, and the penalty was deemed appropriate to maintain public service standards and public faith in government.

Main Doctrine

In administrative proceedings, due process requires an opportunity to be heard, which is satisfied by the chance to explain one's side or seek reconsideration. The absence of a complainant in hearings does not automatically warrant dismissal for failure to prosecute, especially when the complainant is considered a mere witness and no culpable negligence is shown. Factual findings of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are accorded finality.

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