Viudez v. Court of Appeals
MODIFICATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On June 9, 2000, Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot. Subsequently, complaints for murder were filed against multiple individuals, including petitioner Enrique Viudez II, by both the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Division and the victim's widow, Estrella Galvez. A resolution finding probable cause to indict the petitioner and others for murder was issued on March 31, 2001, leading to the filing of two Informations for murder with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, and the issuance of arrest warrants on September 19, 2001. Procedural History: On September 21, 2001, petitioner Viudez II filed a motion to suspend proceedings and the implementation of the arrest warrant, citing Department Circular No. 70 and a pending petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. The RTC denied this motion on September 28, 2001, and again on October 10, 2001, after reconsideration, stating that the court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner and that there was no compelling reason to recall the warrant. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), which initially granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) but ultimately dismissed the petition on December 19, 2001, finding no grave abuse of discretion by the RTC. An alias warrant of arrest was issued by the RTC on January 9, 2002, after the TRO expired. The CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April 11, 2002. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul the CA's decision dismissing the petition for certiorari. Petitioner argues that the CA erred in ruling that Department Circular No. 70 did not obligate the RTC to suspend the proceedings and the implementation of the arrest warrant pending the resolution of his petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. He contends that the circular has the force of law and that its promulgation was in line with existing jurisprudence. Petitioner also sought a TRO and preliminary injunction to prevent his arrest, arguing that irreparable injury would result. The Supreme Court initially issued a TRO, but later denied the petition for review on the merits for lack of merit and the prayer for injunctive relief as moot and academic, holding that the judge's discretion to issue warrants of arrest is exclusive and cannot be deferred by a pending petition for review.
Issue(s)
Whether the implementation of a warrant of arrest issued by the RTC should be suspended pending the resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. Whether DOJ Department Circular No. 70, which states that pending resolution of an appeal, proceedings in court should be held in abeyance, obligates the trial court to suspend the implementation of a warrant of arrest.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit, and the prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction is denied for being moot and academic. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's decision dismissing the petition for certiorari.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of suspending the implementation of a warrant of arrest pending resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner's contention is wrong. It clarified the distinction between the preliminary inquiry for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function performed by a judge, and the preliminary investigation proper, which is an executive function of the prosecutor. The determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is exclusively vested in the judge, and its implementation cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice, as this would constitute an encroachment on the judge's exclusive prerogative. The Court emphasized that the motion filed by the petitioner was to suspend the implementation of the warrant, not to quash it, and there was no contest as to the warrant's validity. The Court reiterated that once an information is filed, any disposition of the case rests on the sound discretion of the court. On the applicability of DOJ Department Circular No. 70: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70, which states that "the appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in abeyance," is directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in choosing remedies. However, the circular does not state that the court must hold proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend proceedings or the implementation of a warrant of arrest remains unhindered. This aligns with the principle that once a complaint or information is filed, the court is in complete control of the case, and its disposition rests on its sound discretion. The trial judge in this case merely exercised his judicial discretion when he denied the motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest, and the CA correctly found no whimsicality or oppressiveness in this exercise of discretion.
Main Doctrine
The implementation of a warrant of arrest, once issued by a judge upon a determination of probable cause, cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice, as this would encroach upon the exclusive prerogative of the judge.