Gosiengfiao v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns the right of legal redemption concerning a residential lot originally owned by the decedent Francisco Gosiengfiao. After his death, the lot, which had been mortgaged, was foreclosed and awarded to the mortgagee bank. One of the heirs, Amparo Gosiengfiao-Ibarra, redeemed the property. Subsequently, Amparo sold the entire property to Leonardo Mariano, who later sold it to his children, Lazaro Mariano and Dionicia M. Aquino. The other heirs of Francisco Gosiengfiao (the petitioner-heirs) filed a complaint for recovery of possession and legal redemption, asserting their co-ownership rights. Procedural History: The initial complaint filed by the petitioner-heirs was dismissed by the trial court, which ruled that Amparo's redemption made her the sole owner. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, recognizing the petitioner-heirs as co-owners with the right to redeem. This Court affirmed the CA's decision in G.R. No. 101522 (Mariano v. Court of Appeals), holding that the petitioner-heirs had not lost their right to redeem because they had not received written notice of the sale. Following this, the petitioner-heirs filed a motion for execution, which the trial court initially granted. However, subsequent rulings by different trial court judges (Judge Beltran and then Judge Luczon) declared that the petitioner-heirs had lost their right of redemption, counting the 30-day period from the finality of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522. The Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Luczon's ruling. The Petition: The petitioner-heirs filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision that they had lost their right of legal redemption. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in counting the 30-day redemption period from the finality of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522. Their primary contention is that the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code must come from the vendor, not from this Court, and that the decision in G.R. No. 101522 itself stated that the redemption period had not yet begun to run due to the lack of such written notice. They also argue that the redemption period is not a prescriptive period and that their use of a writ of execution to exercise their right of redemption was a valid and timely method.
Issue(s)
Whether the 30-day period for legal redemption under Article 1623 of the Civil Code began to run from the finality of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522. Whether the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522 constitutes the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Whether the petitioner-heirs seasonably exercised their right of legal redemption.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The January 17, 2003 decision and September 9, 2003 resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner-heirs' exercise of their right of redemption is declared VALID and LEGAL.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the 30-day period for legal redemption began to run from the finality of this Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522: The Court held that the 30-day period for exercising the right of legal redemption did not commence from the finality of the Mariano Decision. The CA erred in equating the entry of judgment of the Supreme Court's decision with the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code. The Court reiterated that the requirement of a written notice by the vendor or vendee is indispensable for the redemption period to start. The final and executory decision of this Court, while informing the parties of the sale, does not fulfill the specific requirement of Article 1623. Therefore, the redemption period had not even begun to run. On whether the Supreme Court's decision in G.R. No. 101522 constitutes the written notice required by Article 1623 of the Civil Code: The Court unequivocally stated that the Supreme Court's decision is not the written notice contemplated by Article 1623. Citing Castillo v. Samonte and Garcia v. Calaliman, the Court emphasized that the law requires a written notice from the vendor or vendee to remove all uncertainty as to the sale, its terms, and its validity. The Supreme Court, not being the vendor, cannot provide such notice. The Mariano Decision itself stated that "in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run," underscoring that the decision was not the notice itself but a declaration that the period had not commenced due to lack of proper notice. On whether the petitioner-heirs seasonably exercised their right of legal redemption: The Court found that the petitioner-heirs had effectively exercised their right of redemption. Although they filed a motion for execution approximately eight months after the finality of the Mariano Decision, this was considered a seasonable time for execution by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The subsequent notice of redemption, tender of payment, and the Sheriff's Certificate of Redemption were all deemed legally in order, especially since the respondent-buyers refused to accept the tender and comply with the writ. The Court concluded that the petitioner-heirs did not sleep on their rights but rather pursued them through the proper procedural mechanisms for enforcing a final judgment.
Main Doctrine
The 30-day period for exercising the right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the Civil Code does not begin to run without a written notice of the sale served by the vendor or vendee. A final and executory decision of the Supreme Court, while serving as notice of the sale to the parties, does not constitute the written notice required by Article 1623 for the redemption period to commence. The execution of a final judgment by motion within a reasonable period is a permissible mode of enforcing the right of redemption.