Ravina v. Villa Abrille

G.R. No. 160708 · 2009-10-16 · J. QUISUMBING, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Property Law
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: Respondents Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille were married and jointly acquired Lot 7, a parcel of land on which they, through joint efforts and a DBP loan, built a house. Pedro also owned an adjacent lot, Lot 26471, acquired before the marriage. In 1991, Pedro began an affair and, without his wife's consent, offered to sell both lots and the house to petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the Ravinas, but Pedro proceeded with the sale, evidenced by a deed of sale where Mary Ann's signature was absent. Subsequently, Pedro, with the alleged connivance of the Ravinas and CAFGU members, forcibly removed the family's belongings from the house, preventing Mary Ann and their children from re-entering their home. Procedural History: Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint against Pedro and the Ravinas for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages, and Attorney's Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring the sale of Lot 26471 void as to Mary Ann's share, the sale of Lot 7 void as to Mary Ann's share, and the sale of the house void as to Mary Ann's share, also awarding various damages. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the RTC's decision, declaring the sale of Lot 26471 valid, but the sale of Lot 7 and the house void, ordering Pedro to return the consideration for Lot 7 and the house to the Ravinas, and the Ravinas to reconvey Lot 7 and the house to the Villa Abrilles. The appellate court also awarded damages and gave the respondents the option to exercise their rights under Article 450 of the New Civil Code regarding improvements. The Petition: Petitioners Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, arguing that the appellate court erred in declaring the sale of Lot 7 and the house void, in ruling that they were not innocent purchasers for value, and in holding them liable for damages. They contend that Lot 7 was Pedro's exclusive property and that they acted in good faith. The Supreme Court, however, found that Lot 7 was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal property, and that the sale by Pedro without Mary Ann's consent is void under Article 124 of the Family Code. The Court also determined that the Ravinas were not innocent purchasers for value, as they were aware of Mary Ann's objection and the respondents' possession of the property. Consequently, the petition was denied, and the Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed.

Issue(s)

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the sale of Lot 7 (covered by TCT No. T-88674) and the house thereon null and void. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners Patrocinia Ravina and Wilfredo Ravina are not innocent purchasers for value. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners are liable for damages.

Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Decision dated February 21, 2002, and the Resolution dated October 7, 2003, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54560 are affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

On the validity of the sale of Lot 7 and the house: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that the sale of Lot 7 (TCT No. T-88674) and the house thereon was null and void. The Court reiterated the presumption under Article 160 of the New Civil Code that all property acquired during the marriage is conjugal, unless proven otherwise. Since Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, it is presumed conjugal. No sufficient evidence was presented to overcome this presumption. Furthermore, the house was built through joint efforts and a DBP loan, reinforcing its conjugal nature. The sale of conjugal property by one spouse without the consent of the other is void under Article 124 of the Family Code, which was the governing law at the time of the sale in 1991. Mary Ann's lack of consent rendered the sale void as to her share. On whether petitioners are innocent purchasers for value: The Court held that petitioners are not innocent purchasers for value. A buyer in good faith is one who buys without notice of another's right or interest and pays a fair price. While a buyer may rely on the certificate of title, this protection is limited when dealing with property where the seller's capacity to sell is restricted, such as conjugal property. Petitioners were aware that Pedro was married to Mary Ann, and Mary Ann's conformity was absent from the deed. Crucially, they were apprised by Mary Ann's lawyer of her objection to the sale. Moreover, the respondents were in actual, visible, and public possession of the property at the time of the sale, which should have put petitioners on notice of Mary Ann's interest. Therefore, petitioners cannot claim the status of innocent purchasers for value. On the liability for damages: The Court found the claim that the award of damages is unsupported by evidence to be erroneous. The circumstances of the forced removal of Mary Ann and her children from their family home, acting in connivance with the petitioners, warrant condemnation. The Court cited the civil law doctrine that every person must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The petitioners' actions in facilitating the removal of the family's belongings and preventing Mary Ann and her children from entering their home, despite their pleas, fell short of these standards and caused damage, justifying the award of moral and exemplary damages.

Main Doctrine

A sale of conjugal property by the husband without the wife's consent is void. A buyer who proceeds with the purchase despite knowledge of the wife's interest and objection, and the visible possession of the property by the spouses, cannot claim to be a buyer in good faith.

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