Dela Cruz v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from the construction and/or renovation of several multi-purpose halls in various barangays within the City of Tarlac. A post-audit conducted by the Provincial Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) resulted in two Notices of Disallowance. These notices cited violations of constitutional and statutory provisions prohibiting public expenditure for religious purposes, as the auditor determined that the constructed facilities were, in fact, barangay chapels rather than multi-purpose halls. Subsequently, private complainants filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several local government officials of Tarlac City, including the petitioners, for alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, also known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The complaint alleged that the officials conspired and confederated to approve and release funds for these projects, despite knowing they were for religious purposes, thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits. Procedural History: The Ombudsman initially dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence and prematurity. However, upon a motion for reconsideration by the private complainants, the Ombudsman referred the case for review. The Office of the Chief Legal Counsel recommended the filing of an information, leading the Ombudsman to order the Office of the Special Prosecutor to file the necessary information with the Sandiganbayan, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 26042. The accused moved for reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan granted. After reinvestigation, the prosecution found probable cause, and the Sandiganbayan set the case for arraignment and pre-trial. The accused then filed motions to quash the information, which the Sandiganbayan denied, upholding the validity of the information and finding probable cause. The accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente lite. The Sandiganbayan granted this motion, ordering the preventive suspension of the accused. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: The petitioners, Lynn Paz T. Dela Cruz, Fernando Serrano, Nathaniel Lugtu, and Janet S. Pineda, filed this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Sandiganbayan's December 8, 2003 Resolution ordering their suspension pendente lite and its February 5, 2004 Resolution denying their motion for reconsideration. They argue that the criminal case was prematurely instituted due to pending appeals with the COA En Banc, that the Ombudsman improperly reconsidered a final resolution, that the information is fatally defective, and that there is no probable cause to prosecute them. Crucially, the Supreme Court noted that the issues raised in this petition were substantially the same as those previously raised and dismissed in G.R. No. 158308, where the validity of the information and the preliminary investigation were already passed upon. The Court invoked the principle of the law of the case, holding that these issues could no longer be re-litigated and thus affirmed the Sandiganbayan's resolutions.
Issue(s)
Whether the criminal case was prematurely instituted considering the pendency of petitioners’ appeals before the COA En Banc. Whether the Ombudsman may reconsider his Resolution dated July 13, 1999, dismissing the complaint, after the same has already become final and executory. Whether the subject information is fatally defective; and whether, on the basis of the admitted or undisputed facts, there is probable cause to prosecute petitioners and their co-accused for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. On the mandatory nature of preventive suspension and the petitioners' conduct.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Sandiganbayan's December 8, 2003 Resolution, which ordered petitioners’ suspension pendente lite, and its February 5, 2004 Resolution, which denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are affirmed. The case is remanded to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of premature institution and the COA appeals: The Court held that the COA's jurisdiction is limited to administrative accountability and auditing rules. Its disallowance of funds does not preclude the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and prosecute criminal liability. The exoneration of petitioners by the COA En Banc on administrative grounds does not bar criminal prosecution. The Court emphasized that the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts. On the Ombudsman's power to reconsider: The Court found that the private complainants timely moved for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's initial dismissal within the reglementary period. Therefore, the Ombudsman acted within his authority in reconsidering the resolution. Furthermore, any alleged defect in the preliminary investigation was deemed cured by the Sandiganbayan's order for reinvestigation, after which the Ombudsman maintained the existence of probable cause. On the validity of the information and probable cause: The Court invoked the principle of the "law of the case." It noted that the validity of the information, including issues of due process and probable cause, had already been passed upon and resolved by the Supreme Court itself in a previous petition (G.R. No. 158308). The Court found that the petitioners had failed to disclose this prior ruling and were attempting to re-litigate settled issues. The Court reiterated that under the law of the case, what has been irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case. On the mandatory nature of preventive suspension and the petitioners' conduct: The Court reiterated that Section 13 of RA No. 3019 mandates the suspension of any public officer against whom a criminal prosecution under a valid information is pending. The court has no discretion to determine if suspension is necessary; it is automatic upon a finding that the information is valid. The Court cited Luciano v. Mariano for the guidelines on pre-suspension hearings, emphasizing that the accused must be given an opportunity to challenge the validity of the proceedings, but if the grounds are not indubitable, suspension must follow upon upholding the information's validity. The Court expressed deep disapproval of the petitioners' failure to disclose the prior petition (G.R. No. 158308) and their attempt to re-litigate settled issues. The Court cautioned against using legal defenses to cause undue delay in the administration of criminal justice.
Main Doctrine
The principle of the law of the case mandates that once an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case, that question becomes settled and cannot be re-litigated in subsequent appeals. The mandatory preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA 3019 applies upon a finding that the information is valid, and the court has no discretion to withhold it.