Argallon-Jocson v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Ceferina Argallon-Jocson filed a complaint for Reconveyance and Damages against Marcelo Steel Corporation and Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. (MCFC), represented by Jose Marcelo. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Jocson, ordering the defendants to pay P2,004,810.42 with legal interest, P20,000.00 in attorney's fees, and costs. This decision became final and executory after the private respondents' appeal to the Court of Appeals was affirmed and not further appealed. Procedural History: Following the finality of the judgment, a writ of execution was issued, leading to the levy and sale of properties belonging to Marcelo Steel Corporation. Petitioner Rodolfo Tuising emerged as the highest bidder. However, Marcelo Steel Corporation filed a motion to annul the execution sale, claiming its liability was joint and the sale price was inadequate. The trial court declared the execution sale null and void and cancelled the certificate of sale. Petitioners Jocson and Tuising appealed this order via a Petition for Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition. They then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied, leading to the present petition. The Petition: Petitioners Jocson and Tuising seek review of the Court of Appeals' decision and resolution, arguing that the appellate court erred in procedural matters and in affirming the trial court's findings. Specifically, they contend that the Court of Appeals erred in deeming their withdrawal of a notice of appeal and substitution with a petition for certiorari as procedurally impermissible. They also argue that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the obligation as joint rather than solidary, in annulling the execution sale, and in granting the prayer for satisfaction of judgment despite the proceeds of the sale being received. Furthermore, they claim the judge erred in denying Tuising's motion for intervention. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition without merit due to fatal procedural defects, including the petition not being signed by Jocson's counsel and the lack of proper verification and certification against forum shopping by Jocson, who had already pursued a conflicting remedy by filing a motion for alias writ of execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari as a procedural remedy for a lost appeal. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring the obligation of the defendants as joint and not solidary. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for a break-open order and declaring the execution sale null and void. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the prayer for satisfaction of judgment despite receipt of proceeds by petitioner Jocson. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the motion for intervention.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the Decision dated 16 January 2004 and the Resolution dated 25 March 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79179. The Court found the petition fatally defective due to improper signing and verification, and the absence of a proper certification against forum shopping, particularly noting that petitioner Jocson had already taken actions inconsistent with the petition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the procedural defect of the petition: The Court found the petition fatally defective because it was not signed by Jocson's counsel, but by Tuising's counsel without authority. Furthermore, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum Shopping, while Jocson, the principal party, did not. The Court reiterated that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, and a pleading required to be verified that lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. The belated filing of a Special Power of Attorney by Jocson was not accepted as an explanation for the deficiency. The Court emphasized that the signing of the verification and certification by only one of two petitioners is insufficient, as the attestation requires personal knowledge by the party executing it. The Court noted that Jocson, the principal party, had already filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution, indicating her acceptance of the Court of Appeals' decision and rendering the petition for review incompatible with her prior actions. This conduct was deemed an abuse of the judicial process. On the nature of the obligation (joint vs. solidary): The Court of Appeals correctly held that solidary obligations are not presumed and must be expressly stated in the judgment. Since the trial court's decision was silent on the nature of the liability, the obligation was presumed to be joint. Therefore, no defendant could be compelled to satisfy the entire judgment, and the trial court's declaration that Marcelo Steel Corporation's liability was limited to its proportional share was consistent with this presumption. The execution sale, which sought to collect the entire judgment from Marcelo Steel Corporation, was thus properly declared void. On the annulment of the execution sale and denial of break-open order: The trial court correctly declared the execution sale null and void because it was conducted to satisfy a solidary obligation when the judgment only established a joint liability. The sheriffs deviated from the tenor of the decision and the writ of execution by levying upon properties of Marcelo Steel Corporation for the full satisfaction of the judgment. Consequently, the denial of the motion for a break-open order was also proper as it was predicated on the void execution sale. On the satisfaction of judgment: The trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in granting the prayer for satisfaction of judgment filed by Marcelo Steel Corporation. Given that the execution sale was declared void due to the joint nature of the obligation, the deposit made by Marcelo Steel Corporation represented its proportional share and served to satisfy its obligation as determined by the trial court. The fact that Jocson may have received proceeds from the void sale does not negate the propriety of declaring the satisfaction of judgment based on the correct determination of the obligation's nature. On the denial of the motion for intervention: The denial of Tuising's motion for intervention was also proper. Tuising, as the highest bidder in the void execution sale, was not a party to the original case and his interest was contingent upon the validity of the sale. Once the sale was declared void, his claim to intervene based on his status as highest bidder lost its legal basis. The trial court correctly denied his motion for intervention and reconsideration.
Main Doctrine
A petition for review on certiorari must be properly verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping signed by all petitioners. Failure to comply with these requirements, especially when the principal party has already taken actions consistent with an earlier appellate decision, renders the petition fatally defective and warrants its dismissal. Furthermore, the nature of an obligation as joint or solidary must be expressly stated in the judgment; otherwise, it is presumed to be joint, and no defendant may be compelled to satisfy the entire judgment.