People v. Romualdez
REVERSALFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The charge alleged that while serving as Provincial Governor of Leyte, Romualdez used his influence to be appointed Ambassador to foreign countries, knowing this was incompatible with his gubernatorial position. This allegedly allowed him to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Provincial Government of Leyte, causing undue injury to the government. 2. Procedural History: Romualdez moved to quash the information, arguing the facts did not constitute the offense and that the criminal action had prescribed. The Sandiganbayan initially granted the motion to quash, finding that the information did not sufficiently allege undue injury to the government, as collecting compensation for actual services rendered does not inherently constitute damage. The Sandiganbayan also found that the act of appointment was the responsibility of the appointing authority, not the appointee, and that receiving dual compensation for services rendered was not necessarily indicative of evident bad faith or gross negligence. The People moved for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied, reiterating its findings. The People then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The People filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Sandiganbayan for quashing the information. Romualdez responded with a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the proper remedy was an appeal under Rule 45, not certiorari under Rule 65, and reiterated his prescription argument. The Supreme Court initially granted the petition, finding that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion by quashing the information, as it sufficiently alleged the elements of the offense. However, Romualdez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, focusing on the prescription argument. The Supreme Court, in a subsequent resolution, granted the motion for reconsideration, reversed its earlier decision, and dismissed the petition, holding that the charges had prescribed due to the prolonged delay in the commencement of the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman, rendering the criminal action extinguished.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information. Whether the facts alleged in the Information constitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019. Whether the criminal action or liability of the accused has been extinguished by prescription.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the Second Motion for Reconsideration, reversed its Decision dated 23 July 2008 and Resolution dated 9 September 2008, and dismissed the Petition. The Court held that the criminal charges against respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez had prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
The Sandiganbayan's quashing of the Information was not grave abuse of discretion because the criminal charges against respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez had prescribed. The Court did not explicitly rule on whether the facts alleged in the Information constitute a violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, as the case was resolved based on prescription. On the Issue of Prescription: The Court found that the criminal charges against respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez had prescribed. The offense was alleged to have been committed between 1976 and February 1986, but the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on November 5, 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced on June 4, 2001. This period clearly exceeded the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period provided under Section 11 of R.A. 3019. The Court clarified that the initial filing of a complaint in 1989 with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and the subsequent preliminary investigation by the PCGG could not have interrupted the prescriptive period. This is because the PCGG's preliminary investigation was void ab initio for lack of authority, as its investigatory power was limited to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases without prior presidential authority to investigate graft and corruption cases involving Marcos cronies. A void ab initio proceeding cannot be accorded any legal effect and thus cannot toll the prescriptive period. The rule is that for criminal violations of R.A. 3019, the prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation. Since this preliminary investigation commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the offense had already prescribed. The Court reiterated its ruling in Romualdez v. Marcelo, which involved similar premises where an initial investigation by the PCGG was deemed null and void, leading to the conclusion that no proceedings existed that could have suspended the prescriptive periods. The Court emphasized that the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG, and therefore could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods. The Court noted that while the Sandiganbayan had rejected the claim of prescription, it quashed the information on a different ground, and the subsequent proceedings highlighted the prescription issue, making the earlier quashal the correct result.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reversed its prior decision, granting the second motion for reconsideration and dismissing the petition, holding that the charges against respondent Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez had prescribed, as the initial preliminary investigation conducted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was void ab initio and thus did not interrupt the prescriptive period.