Torres v. Satsatin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Siblings Sofia, Fructosa, and Mario Torres, along with a certain Rustica Aledia, each owned substantial tracts of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite. In 1997, Nicanor Satsatin approached their mother, Agripina Aledia, about purchasing these properties. Agripina agreed, and the Torres siblings subsequently granted Nicanor a Special Power of Attorney to negotiate the sale. In 1999, Nicanor offered the lands to Solar Resources, Inc. (Solar) for P35,000,000.00. The agreement stipulated that Nicanor would remit P28,000,000.00 to the Torres siblings, P9,333,333.00 each. Petitioners allege that Solar paid the full purchase price to Nicanor via thirty-two post-dated checks. Between January 2000 and April 2002, Nicanor allegedly acquired a house and lot and a car, registered in the names of his children, Nikki Normel and Nikki Norlin Satsatin. Despite receiving the full payment, Nicanor only remitted P9,000,000.00 to the Torres siblings, leaving a balance of P19,000,000.00. Repeated demands for the outstanding amount went unheeded. Procedural History: On October 25, 2002, the Torres siblings filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Nicanor, Ermilinda, Nikki Normel, and Nikki Norlin Satsatin before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite. Simultaneously, they filed an ex-parte motion for a writ of attachment, alleging the respondents' intent to depart the Philippines and the existence of unencumbered properties. The RTC directed the petitioners to post a P7,000,000.00 bond. After petitioners posted the bond and filed a motion for deputization, the RTC issued a Writ of Attachment on November 15, 2002. The writ was served on November 19, 2002, leading to the levy of respondents' real and personal properties. Summons, however, was served on November 21, 2002. Respondents filed an Answer and a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment, citing procedural defects. The RTC denied the motion to discharge but directed respondents to file a counter-bond of P7,000,000.00. Subsequent motions by the respondents to lift or set aside the order were denied. Aggrieved, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals (CA). The Petition: The respondents' petition to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83595, argued that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by issuing the writ of attachment without prior acquisition of jurisdiction over their persons and despite non-compliance with formal requisites for the bond and writ. They contended that the writ was implemented before summons was served and that the bonding company lacked proper clearance to transact business in Cavite. The CA granted the petition, nullifying the RTC's orders and lifting the levy on the properties. The petitioners, Sofia Torres, Fructosa Torres, Heirs of Mario Torres, and Solar Resources, Inc., now seek review via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA's decision and resolution. They argue that the CA erred in lifting the writ, in holding the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion regarding the bond, and in not dismissing the petition due to estoppel, laches, and prescription. They also contend that the CA erred in holding that the writ was improperly enforced and that estoppel would not lie against the respondents.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in lifting the writ of attachment. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of attachment despite alleged defects in the bond and its issuance. Whether the respondents are barred by estoppel, laches, and prescription from questioning the RTC orders. Whether the writ of attachment was improperly and irregularly enforced in violation of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 83595 are AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of lifting the writ of attachment: The Court of Appeals correctly found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in approving the surety bond posted by petitioners because not all requisites for its approval were met. Specifically, the Certification from the Office of the Court Administrator indicated that the bonding company was qualified to transact business only in specific cities, not in the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, where the bond was accepted. Therefore, the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of attachment founded on such a bond. On the validity of the writ's implementation and jurisdiction over the person: The Court reiterated that for the implementation of a writ of attachment, it is essential that the court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. This jurisdiction is typically acquired through service of summons. In this case, the writ of attachment was implemented on November 19, 2002, but the summons and complaint were served only on November 21, 2002. This belated service meant that at the time of implementation, the trial court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the respondents. Consequently, even if the writ was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and could not bind or affect the respondents. On the grounds for discharging the writ and estoppel/laches: The Court clarified that an attachment debtor is not deemed to have waived defects in the issuance of the writ by availing of a counter-bond; filing a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of discharging the attachment. The respondents based their motion to lift the writ on irregularities in its issuance and service, not on the merits of the petitioners' cause of action. Therefore, the arguments of estoppel, laches, and prescription raised by petitioners were devoid of merit, as the issue of improper enforcement remained valid. On the effect of belated service of summons: The Court emphasized that subsequent service of summons does not confer retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. The law does not allow retroactivity of belated service. Therefore, the trial court could not enforce a coercive process like a writ of attachment without first obtaining jurisdiction over the respondents' person, either by prior or simultaneous service of summons with the writ's implementation.
Main Doctrine
A writ of attachment, even if validly issued, is improperly or irregularly enforced and therefore cannot bind or affect the defendant if it is implemented without prior or simultaneous service of summons and a copy of the complaint upon the defendant, as such belated service does not confer retroactive jurisdiction.