Diño v. Olivarez
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners Bienvenido Diño and Renato Comparativo filed a complaint for vote buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. The complaint alleged that on May 10, 2004, Olivarez, along with co-accused Remedios Malibiran and Carmelo Jaro, distributed Uniwide gift certificates to voters to influence them to vote for Olivarez, who was a candidate for City Mayor of Parañaque. Two Informations were filed charging violations of Section 261, paragraphs a, b, and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. 2. Procedural History: Following the filing of the Informations, respondent Olivarez appealed the Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and filed a Motion to Quash the Informations before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City, Branch 274, alleging duplicity of offenses. The COMELEC's Law Department directed the city prosecutor to transmit the records and suspend further proceedings. Subsequently, the city prosecutor filed Amended Informations, which the RTC admitted, denying the Motion to Quash. The RTC also denied motions for reconsideration and ordered the arrest of respondent Olivarez for failure to appear at his arraignment. Olivarez then filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which nullified the RTC's orders, finding that the COMELEC had the authority to revoke the delegated prosecution powers and that the RTC erred in admitting the amended informations and issuing the arrest order. The Supreme Court, however, treated the petition as a Rule 45 review. 3. The Petition: Petitioners seek review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision to nullify the RTC's orders. They argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the amended informations were filed when the public prosecutor lacked authority, in crediting the respondent's claim about the timing of COMELEC's resolution, and in making the temporary restraining order permanent. The core issues are whether the City Prosecutor exceeded its jurisdiction in filing the amended informations, whether the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting them and denying the motion to quash, and whether the arrest warrant and confiscation of bail were lawful. The Supreme Court ultimately found merit in the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals' decision and ordering the continuation of proceedings before the RTC under the COMELEC's Law Department.
Issue(s)
Whether the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it filed the Amended Informations, and whether Judge Madrona acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he admitted the said Amended Informations and denied the respondent’s motion to quash. Whether Judge Madrona acted in accordance with law when he issued the warrant for the arrest of the respondent and ordered the confiscation of his cash bond due to the latter’s failure to appear for arraignment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition, REVERSED the Decision of the Court of Appeals, and ordered the continuation of the proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105 before the RTC, under the direction of the Law Department of the COMELEC.
Ratio Decidendi
On the first issue (authority to file Amended Informations and admission thereof): The Supreme Court found merit in the petition. It held that the public prosecutors, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC. Resolution No. 7457, which revoked the deputation of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque, was issued on April 4, 2005, after the Amended Informations were filed on October 28, 2004. The earlier letter from the COMELEC Law Department dated October 11, 2004, merely directed the transmission of records and suspension of further implementation of the resolution, not a revocation of the continuing authority. The filing of the Amended Informations was necessitated by the respondent's Motion to Quash, which alleged that more than one offense was charged. Under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, a complaint or information may be amended in form or substance without leave of court before the accused enters a plea. The prosecutor's action was a precautionary measure to avert the dismissal of the cases and avoid wasting government resources and delaying justice, and was not an act of defiance to the COMELEC. Consequently, Judge Madrona acted in accordance with law when he admitted these Informations and dismissed the respondent’s Motion to Quash, as the ground stated therein—the informations charged more than one offense—could no longer be sustained. The Court clarified that the COMELEC's directive to suspend proceedings was not meant to allow the prosecutor to abandon the case and let it be dismissed due to a curable defect. On the second issue (warrant of arrest and confiscation of bond): The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Madrona when he issued the orders for the arrest of the respondent and the confiscation of his cash bond due to his failure to appear for arraignment. These orders are consistent with criminal procedure. The filing of an information initiates a criminal action, and the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the case. Arraignment follows as a matter of course. Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the suspension of arraignment in specific cases, including when a petition for review is pending before a reviewing office, but this suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days. In this case, the respondent filed his appeal on October 7, 2004. The arraignment was reset multiple times, and it was only on March 9, 2005—five months after the appeal was filed—that the arraignment was held and the bench warrant issued. This period far exceeded the sixty days allowed by the rules. Therefore, Judge Madrona acted in accordance with law in issuing the warrant of arrest and ordering the confiscation of the cash bond, as the respondent's failure to appear for arraignment after the permissible period for suspension had lapsed justified such actions. The Court of Appeals' reliance on Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How was misplaced as that case was decided before the revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which introduced the 60-day period for suspension.
Main Doctrine
The filing of amended informations by a public prosecutor, even after the COMELEC directed the suspension of proceedings, is not improper if it is a necessary step to avert the dismissal of the case due to a defect (like charging multiple offenses) and is done before the COMELEC's revocation of deputation takes effect. Furthermore, the arraignment of an accused cannot be indefinitely suspended by the pendency of an appeal before a reviewing authority; the rules provide a specific period for such suspension, and failure to appear for arraignment after such period justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest.