Cabreza v. Cabreza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case originated from a petition filed by Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. (respondent) seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Amparo Robles Cabreza (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 70, of Pasig City. The RTC granted the petition on January 3, 2001, declaring the marriage null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The court further ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, without prejudice to the rights of creditors. Procedural History: Following the declaration of nullity, the respondent filed a motion for execution on March 7, 2003, to liquidate the conjugal partnership, which consisted solely of a real property. The RTC granted this motion on May 26, 2003, ordering the sale of the property and the distribution of the proceeds. Subsequent orders from the RTC authorized the sale, the approval of the deed of absolute sale, and the issuance of a writ of possession. The petitioner challenged these orders, including a motion to hold in abeyance the writ of possession and notice to vacate, which was denied by the RTC on August 4, 2004. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC's orders. The CA denied this petition on December 7, 2005, and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration on February 7, 2006. The Petition: The petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the CA's decision and resolution. The petitioner argues that the orders of possession, writ of execution/possession, and notice to vacate vary the terms of the dispositive portion of the RTC's January 3, 2001 decision, specifically by authorizing the sale of the family home. She anchors her argument on Article 129(9) of the Family Code, which provides for the adjudication of the conjugal dwelling to the spouse with whom the majority of the children choose to remain. The petitioner also contends that there is another conjugal property, which was allegedly presented and forms part of the record. The respondent, however, argues that the petition raises questions of fact and issues already resolved with finality, pointing to previous petitions filed by the petitioner that were dismissed by the CA and this Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the orders of possession, writ of possession, and notice to vacate varied the terms of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision. Whether Article 129(9) of the Family Code, regarding the adjudication of the conjugal dwelling, is applicable in this case. Whether there exists another conjugal property besides the one ordered to be sold.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The December 7, 2005 Decision and February 7, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the orders of possession, writ of possession, and notice to vacate varied the terms of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not indirectly reopen a final and executory order by questioning subsequent implementing orders. The RTC's May 26, 2003 Order, which authorized the sale of the family home, had become final and executory after the petitioner's earlier petition assailing it was dismissed by the CA and subsequently by the Supreme Court. The Court emphasized that the subsequent orders for possession and to vacate were merely implementing the final and executory order of sale. To allow the petitioner to raise this argument again would permit her to indirectly reopen a failed petition, which is contrary to the principle of res judicata. The Court noted that the petitioner had already questioned the sale of the family home in a prior petition (CA-G.R. SP No. 77506), which was dismissed. Therefore, the current petition, raising the same issue, should also fail. On the applicability of Article 129(9) of the Family Code: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's ruling that Article 129(9) of the Family Code, which provides for the adjudication of the conjugal dwelling to the spouse with whom the majority of the children choose to remain, is applicable only in the partition of properties. In this case, the conjugal dwelling was the sole asset of the conjugal partnership and was ordered to be sold for liquidation. The Court reiterated that the RTC's May 26, 2003 Order specifically directed the sale of the property and distribution of the proceeds, a directive that had attained finality. The Court found that the petitioner was attempting to change a final judgment that clearly ordered the sale of the property. The fact that the children, even if of legal age, opted to stay with the petitioner did not override the final and executory order for the sale of the conjugal home. On the existence of another conjugal property: The Supreme Court held that the allegation of the existence of another conjugal property was a question of fact that could not be the proper subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Court reiterated its policy that it is not a trier of facts and that factual findings of the CA, when supported by substantial evidence and in agreement with the trial court's findings, are binding and conclusive. Both the RTC and the CA found that the property covered by TCT No. 17460 was the only asset of the conjugal partnership involved in the partition. Therefore, the Court found no reason to reverse these concurrent factual findings.
Main Doctrine
A party cannot indirectly reopen a final and executory order by questioning subsequent implementing orders, especially when the issue raised in the subsequent petition was already passed upon or could have been passed upon in a prior petition that was dismissed with finality.