Lopez v. Umale-Cosme
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Gloria Umale-Cosme, owner of an apartment building, filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner Hernania "Lani" Lopez, a lessee of one of its units. The grounds for the complaint were the expiration of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals from December 1998. Petitioner denied defaulting on rent, asserting that the respondent deliberately avoided collection to falsely claim arrears and that she had been depositing the monthly rentals in a bank for the respondent since February 1999. Procedural History: The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City ruled in favor of the respondent, ordering the petitioner to vacate the premises, pay back rentals, and attorney's fees. However, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed this decision, finding that the lease contract lacked a definite period and that under Batas Pambansa Bilang 877, a lessee cannot be ejected on the ground of contract expiration if the period is not definite. The RTC dismissed the case. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the RTC's decision, holding that a month-to-month lease is a lease with a definite period that expires at the end of each month, especially when written notices to vacate were given. The Petition: Petitioner Hernania "Lani" Lopez filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision. She argued that the CA erred in ruling that she could be ejected on the ground of lease contract termination. The Supreme Court, however, found the petition to be without merit, affirming the CA's decision and reiterating that month-to-month leases are considered to have a definite period that expires at the end of each month, allowing for ejectment upon proper notice.
Issue(s)
Whether a month-to-month lease agreement, where rentals are paid monthly, is considered a lease with a definite period for purposes of ejectment. Whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 suspends the lessor's right to eject a lessee on the ground of lease expiration in a month-to-month lease.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether a month-to-month lease is a lease with a definite period: It is well-settled that where a contract of lease is on a month-to-month basis, the lease is considered one with a definite period. This period expires at the end of each thirty-day period. The Supreme Court has consistently held that in such cases, the lessor has the right to demand ejectment at the end of any given month, as the contract expires by operation of law. This principle was reiterated in Leo Wee v. De Castro, where the Court ruled that monthly rentals imply a lease period that terminates at the end of each month, granting the lessor the right to eject the lessee upon expiration. The petitioner's argument that the lease lacked a definite period was found to be without merit, especially since she herself alleged continuous occupancy and payment of monthly rentals since 1975, implicitly acknowledging the month-to-month nature of the lease. The Court found that the petitioner was merely "grasping at straws" with this argument. On the issue of whether Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 suspends the lessor's right to eject in a month-to-month lease: The Supreme Court clarified that Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 (BP 877) does not suspend the effects of Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Article 1687 provides that if the rent is paid monthly, the lease is understood to be from month to month. While BP 877 suspends the provisions of Article 1673(1) of the Civil Code regarding ejectment due to lease expiration, this suspension applies "except when the lease is for a definite period." A month-to-month lease, as established, is considered to have a definite period. Therefore, the exception applies, and the lessor's right to eject based on the expiration of the monthly period is not suspended. The CA correctly applied this interpretation, citing Acab v. Court of Appeals, which held that Section 6 of BP 877 does not suspend Article 1687. The Court further noted that the lessor's right to rescind the contract for non-payment of increased rentals, as recognized in Chua v. Victorio, could also be a basis for ejectment, although the primary ground here was the expiration of the monthly lease period.
Main Doctrine
A month-to-month lease agreement, where rentals are paid monthly, is considered a lease with a definite period that expires at the end of each month, allowing the lessor to initiate ejectment proceedings upon proper notice and demand, notwithstanding the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 suspending ejectment based on lease expiration for leases without a definite period.