Wee v. Republic

G.R. No. 177384 · 2009-12-08 · J. DEL CASTILLO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Josephine Wee applied for the registration of title to a 4,870-square meter parcel of land, Lot No. 8349, in Silang, Cavite. She claimed ownership in fee simple by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 1, 1993, from Julian Gonzales. Wee asserted that she and her predecessor-in-interest had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful, and adverse possession of the land since time immemorial, seeking registration under the Property Registration Decree or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application, arguing that neither Wee nor her predecessor-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the land is part of the public domain. 2. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, initially granted Wee's application for registration on April 2, 2002, finding that she had satisfied the conditions for registration based on the deed of sale, tax declarations, tax payments, and evidence of possession. The Republic appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC erred in granting the application because Wee failed to meet the legal requirements, particularly regarding possession since June 12, 1945, given that the land was classified as alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982. The CA reversed the RTC's decision on April 28, 2006, holding that Wee had not sufficiently proven her and her predecessor-in-interest's possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. The CA denied Wee's motion for reconsideration on April 3, 2007. 3. The Petition: Wee filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the CA's decision and resolution. She argued that the testimony of Julian Gonzales's widow, Juana Gonzales, proved prior possession, that the presence of coffee trees indicated cultivation and actual possession, and that tax declarations dating back to 1957 showed active possession. The Republic countered that the land only became alienable and disposable in 1982, precluding possession since 1945, and that there was no proof of clear acts of dominion or ownership, such as structures or plantings, beyond mere casual cultivation. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding that Wee failed to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12, 1945, and also failed to prove possession in the concept of an owner due to a lack of evidence of occupation, development, or maintenance.

Issue(s)

Whether petitioner Josephine Wee and her predecessor-in-interest, Julian Gonzales, sufficiently proved open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Whether the presence of coffee trees and early tax declarations constitute sufficient evidence of possession in the concept of an owner.

Ruling

The petition is denied. The Court of Appeals' decision affirming the denial of the application for registration of title is affirmed.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of proving open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession: The Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that she and her predecessor-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. The claim of possession since 1945 was based solely on the bare allegations of Juana Gonzales, which did not meet the required quantum of evidence. Furthermore, the earliest tax declaration presented was from 1957, which is long after June 1945, and the five tax declarations for the period 1957-1985 were considered intermittent and sporadic, insufficient to prove continuous possession. The Court reiterated that tax declarations, in the absence of other competent evidence, do not conclusively establish possession or the declarant's right to registration of title. On the issue of possession in the concept of an owner: The Court agreed with the CA that the petitioner failed to demonstrate possession in the concept of an owner. The claim that the property was planted with coffee was insufficient, as there was no proof of who planted the trees, whether they were maintained or harvested, or what other acts of cultivation or development were undertaken. Petitioner herself admitted she was not doing anything with the property because it was not productive. The Court noted that earlier tax declarations described the land as "unirrigated riceland" with no declared improvements or plantings, and it was only in the petitioner's 1993 tax declaration that coffee was mentioned. Therefore, the mere existence of coffee plants, without evidence of cultivation or other acts of ownership, was not sufficient to support a claim of title.

Main Doctrine

An applicant for land registration bears the burden of proving by clear, positive, and convincing evidence that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Mere allegations, intermittent tax declarations, and the presence of fruit-bearing trees without proof of cultivation do not suffice to establish the required quantum of evidence.

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