First Philippine Holdings v. Trans Middle East

G.R. No. 179505 · 2009-12-04 · J. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Commercial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPHC), formerly Meralco Securities Corporation, sold 6,299,179 shares of common stock in Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB) to Trans Middle East (Phils.) Equities Inc. (TMEE) on May 24, 1984. FPHC alleged that TMEE obtained these shares through fraud and acts contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy. These shares were part of sequestered properties allegedly amassed by Benjamin Romualdez during the Marcos regime. Procedural History: FPHC filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan on December 28, 1988. The Sandiganbayan initially denied the motion, but this Court reversed the denial in G.R. No. 120095, directing the Sandiganbayan to admit FPHC's complaint. On June 27, 2006, TMEE filed a Motion to Dismiss FPHC's Complaint-in-Intervention, arguing that the action had prescribed. TMEE contended that under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, FPHC had four years from May 24, 1984, to annul the sale due to fraud, making its December 28, 1988 filing seven months late. FPHC argued that the prescriptive period should commence from February 24, 1986, when former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed, as it was only then that the alleged intimidation ceased. The Sandiganbayan granted TMEE's motion to dismiss on February 22, 2007, finding no credible reason why FPHC could not have filed earlier and noting the delay in filing even after Marcos's ouster. FPHC's motion for reconsideration, where it argued the sale was void ab initio and thus imprescriptible, or alternatively, that prescription should be reckoned from February 26, 1986, was denied on September 6, 2007. The Petition: FPHC filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the Sandiganbayan's resolutions dismissing its Complaint-in-Intervention.

Issue(s)

Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing FPHC's Complaint-in-Intervention on the ground of prescription. Whether the sale of PCIB shares by FPHC to TMEE was void ab initio or merely voidable. Whether the prescriptive period for FPHC's action commenced from the date of the sale (May 24, 1984) or from the cessation of alleged intimidation (February 24, 1986).

Ruling

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated February 22, 2007, and September 6, 2007, dismissing FPHC's Complaint-in-Intervention. The Court held that the sale was voidable, not void ab initio, and that the action had prescribed.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of prescription: The Court reiterated that a contract is voidable when consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or fraud, as provided in Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The allegations in FPHC's Complaint-in-Intervention indicated a voidable contract, not one that was void ab initio. A voidable contract is valid and binding until annulled, whereas a void contract is considered nonexistent from the beginning. The prayer for nullity does not determine the nature of the action; rather, it is the material allegations of fact that govern. Therefore, the applicable prescriptive period is four years under Article 1391 of the Civil Code. The Court affirmed that trial courts have the authority to dismiss an action on the ground of prescription when the facts establishing it are apparent in the pleadings or records. The pleadings in this case clearly showed the date of the sale (May 24, 1984) and the date of filing the complaint-in-intervention (December 28, 1988), demonstrating that the four-year prescriptive period had lapsed. Thus, a trial on the merits was not necessary to determine prescription, and FPHC was not denied due process as it had ample opportunity to be heard through its pleadings. On the nature of the contract (void ab initio vs. voidable): The Court clarified that for actions based on fraud, the prescriptive period under Article 1391 of the Civil Code begins from the time of the discovery of the fraud. FPHC alleged that the sale was obtained through fraud. The Court found that FPHC had actual knowledge of the sale on May 24, 1984, and did not question it until December 28, 1988, which was four years and seven months later. This period exceeded the four-year prescriptive limit. The argument that the period should commence from the cessation of intimidation (February 24, 1986) was unconvincing because the primary ground alleged was fraud, not solely intimidation, and FPHC was aware of the sale from its inception. The Court found FPHC's reliance on the case of Islamic Directorate to be misplaced, because in the present case, the disposition of the shares was made by a legitimate and authorized corporate board, absent any prior declaration of illegitimacy. Therefore, the principle of a sale being void ab initio due to an unauthorized seller did not apply. On the commencement of the prescriptive period: The Court clarified that for actions based on fraud, the prescriptive period under Article 1391 of the Civil Code begins from the time of the discovery of the fraud. FPHC alleged that the sale was obtained through fraud. The Court found that FPHC had actual knowledge of the sale on May 24, 1984, and did not question it until December 28, 1988, which was four years and seven months later. This period exceeded the four-year prescriptive limit.

Main Doctrine

A contract where consent is vitiated by fraud is voidable, not void ab initio. The prescriptive period for actions to annul voidable contracts based on fraud commences from the time of discovery of the fraud, not from the cessation of intimidation or threat, unless the fraud itself is intrinsically linked to intimidation.

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