Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded a contract for infrastructure works to A.C. Cruz Construction. Candido M. Fajutag, Jr. was designated Project Engineer. A Variation/Extra Work Order was approved. Fajutag, Jr. discovered deficiencies and issued a Work Instruction requiring supporting documents, which the contractor failed to provide. Further verification revealed no actual excavation and road filling works were undertaken, and the quantities were overestimated to the prejudice of the government. The NHA recommended termination of the contract. The Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined the contractor's accomplishment at 40.89%. The NHA rescinded the contract. Subsequently, the remaining work was awarded to Triad Construction and Development Corporation (Triad). Triad discovered that some work items reported as accomplished were non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to the Commission on Audit (COA). COA's special audit uncovered anomalies, including ghost activities and substandard workmanship, confirming that A.C. Cruz Construction had been overpaid by ₱232,628.35. Procedural History: Petitioner Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr., along with other NHA officials and the contractor, was charged with Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, raising grounds including that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and violation of his constitutional rights. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan's resolutions, arguing grave abuse of discretion for upholding the Information's validity despite alleged inadequacies, for denying his motion to quash, and for using prosecution memoranda to supplement the Information. He contended that his right to be informed of the accusation was violated and that the facts charged did not constitute an offense as no damage was caused. He also argued that the Sandiganbayan lost jurisdiction upon dismissal of charges against co-accused.
Issue(s)
Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash. Whether the Information sufficiently stated the offense charged and conformed to the prescribed form; and whether the petitioner's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was violated. Whether the facts charged in the Information constitute an offense. Whether the Sandiganbayan retained jurisdiction over the petitioner after the dismissal of charges against some co-accused.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The Court held that the denial of a motion to quash is generally not correctible by certiorari, unless there is grave abuse of discretion. The Information was found to be sufficient as it alleged the essential elements of Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Court also ruled that conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime does not require the Information to detail the individual participation of each accused. Finally, the Sandiganbayan retained jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari to review denial of a motion to quash: The Court reiterated the general rule that a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order like a denial of a motion to quash. However, an exception exists when the court, in denying the motion, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. In this case, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan, thus upholding the general rule. On the sufficiency of the Information and the violation of the right to be informed: The Court applied the fundamental test for a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense: whether the facts, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. Citing Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the Court emphasized that an information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the offended party, and the time and place of commission. The Information in this case was found to sufficiently allege the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, including the status of the accused as public officers, the commission of the offense in relation to their duties, the causing of undue injury or unwarranted benefits, and the acting with manifest partiality or evident bad faith. The Court held that the Information, by alleging the ultimate facts constituting the essential elements of the crime, sufficiently apprised the petitioner of the accusation against him. The specific participation of each accused, the absence of damage, and other factual details were considered matters of defense to be threshed out during trial, not grounds for quashing the Information. The Court reiterated that informations need only state the ultimate facts, with the reasons to be proved during trial, citing Domingo v. Sandiganbayan. On whether the facts charged in the Information constitute an offense, including the allegation of conspiracy: The Court clarified that when conspiracy is charged as a mode of committing a crime, as in this case, there is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information. The Information need not detail the individual acts of each conspirator because conspiracy itself is not the gravamen of the offense. The conspiracy is significant only in that it makes all accused answerable as co-principals. The Court cited People v. Quitlong to emphasize that an indictment for conspiracy need not aver all its components or details of each party's performance, as long as it reasonably informs the accused of the offense charged and enables them to prepare their defense. The Information alleged that the accused connived, confederated, and mutually helped each other with deliberate intent, manifest partiality, and evident bad faith, which was deemed sufficient. On the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction and the dismissal of charges against co-accused: The Court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the petitioner, even though his position was salary grade 26. Citing Geduspan v. People and Lacson v. Executive Secretary, the Court explained that jurisdiction is determined by the position held by the public officer, not solely by the salary grade. As a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned and controlled corporation, petitioner's position falls within the ambit of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction under R.A. No. 8249, especially when the offense is committed in relation to his office. The Court found that the dismissal of charges against some co-accused did not render the Information unintelligible with respect to the petitioner. The Information sufficiently made out a case against the petitioner and the remaining accused, and the alleged irregularities in using prosecution memoranda were adequately addressed by the Sandiganbayan's explanation that these were used to clarify issues raised in previous court directives, not to supplement an inadequate Information.
Main Doctrine
The denial of a motion to quash is generally not correctible by certiorari, unless the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. An information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time and place of commission. For conspiracy as a mode of committing a crime, the information need not detail the individual participation of each accused, as long as it alleges conspiracy and the contemplated crime in language sufficient to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation.