Valdez v. Republic
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Angelita Valdez married Sofio Polborosa on January 11, 1971, and they had a child, Nancy. Sofio left their conjugal dwelling in March 1972 due to constant arguments over his unemployment. In May 1972, petitioner returned to her parents' home. Three years later, in October 1975, Sofio reappeared, and they agreed to separate, executing a document to that effect, which was the last time petitioner saw or heard from Sofio. Believing Sofio to be dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985. Virgilio's US naturalization application was denied because petitioner's marriage to Sofio was subsisting. Consequently, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Camiling, Tarlac, dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that petitioner failed to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was dead, as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC noted that petitioner admitted not trying to find Sofio after their agreement to separate and that her daughter testified to being prevented from looking for her father. The RTC also considered the possibility that Sofio was still alive. The Petition: Petitioner sought the reversal of the RTC Decision, arguing that the Civil Code, not the Family Code, should apply since her marriage to Sofio predated the Family Code, and applying the Family Code would impair her vested right to her subsequent marriage to Virgilio Reyes, which was valid under the Civil Code. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) recommended setting aside the RTC Decision, arguing that the "well-founded belief" requirement of the Family Code was not applicable, that petitioner had acquired a vested right under the Civil Code, that Article 390 of the Civil Code was not repealed by the Family Code, and that Article 256 of the Family Code prohibits retroactive application that impairs vested rights.
Issue(s)
Whether the provisions of the Family Code, specifically Article 41 requiring a "well-founded belief" of the absent spouse's death, apply to a petition for declaration of presumptive death filed by a spouse whose marriage was celebrated under the Civil Code. Whether a judicial declaration of presumptive death is necessary under the Civil Code for a subsequent marriage to be considered valid.
Ruling
The Petition is DENIED. However, the Court declares that petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio Reyes at the time their marriage was celebrated in 1985, and therefore, the said marriage is legal and valid.
Ratio Decidendi
On the applicability of the Family Code and the requirement of "well-founded belief": The Court held that the RTC erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code and requiring petitioner to prove a "well-founded belief" that Sofio was dead. The marriages of petitioner to Sofio (January 11, 1971) and Virgilio (June 20, 1985) were both celebrated under the Civil Code. Article 83 of the Civil Code, not Article 41 of the Family Code, governs the validity of subsequent marriages contracted under the Civil Code. Under Article 83(1) of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage is valid if the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years without news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee is generally considered dead and believed to be so by the spouse present. The Court emphasized that petitioner could not be expected to comply with the "well-founded belief" requirement of the Family Code, as it was not yet in existence at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. Furthermore, Article 256 of the Family Code explicitly states that its provisions shall not be retroactively applied if they prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Applying the stricter provisions of the Family Code would invalidate petitioner's second marriage, which was valid when celebrated, thus impairing her vested right. On the necessity of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under the Civil Code: The Court reiterated its ruling in previous cases, such as In re Szatraw, Lukban v. Republic, and Gue v. Republic, that under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for it to arise. Article 390 of the Civil Code provides that after an absence of seven years, an absentee shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for succession. The Court clarified that a petition for judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be entertained under the Civil Code because it is not authorized by law; the presumption arises by operation of law. Since Sofio had been absent from May 1972 until October 1975, and then disappeared again after their agreement to separate in October 1975, he would have been absent for seven years by October 1982. Therefore, by operation of law, Sofio was presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner's marriage to Virgilio Reyes on June 20, 1985, there was no legal impediment to her capacity to marry, and her second marriage was valid under paragraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.
Main Doctrine
Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death arises by operation of law after seven years of absence, and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. A petition for judicial declaration of presumptive death cannot be entertained under the Civil Code as it is not authorized by law.