Gutierrez Hermanos v. Riva
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Gutierrez Hermanos obtained a judgment against Antonio de la Riva. The Supreme Court modified this judgment on January 12, 1909, ordering the defendant to pay P93,963.30 with interest. Procedural History: The record was returned to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of origin. The plaintiff presented a bill of costs on February 25, 1909. On February 24, 1914, the plaintiff moved the CFI to enter judgment in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, which the CFI granted. Writs of execution were issued on March 19, 1918, and November 5, 1918, but were returned unsatisfied or no return was made. On February 15, 1922, the plaintiff filed a new suit to revive the judgment. The Appeal: The defendant appealed the CFI's decision, raising issues concerning the timeliness of the execution writs and the subsequent action to revive the judgment, arguing that the periods for execution and revival had already lapsed.
Issue(s)
Whether the writs of execution issued in 1918 were within the five-year period prescribed by Section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Whether the action to revive the judgment, filed on February 15, 1922, was tenable, considering the prescriptive periods under the Code of Civil Procedure.
Ruling
The Court ruled that the writs of execution issued in 1918 were issued beyond the five-year period for execution and were therefore of no legal effect. Consequently, the action to revive the judgment, filed on February 15, 1922, was also filed after the judgment had prescribed. The complaint was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the five-year period for issuing a writ of execution under Section 443 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be computed from the date of the judgment's entry by the Supreme Court, which was February 3, 1909. The judgment entered by the Court of First Instance on February 26, 1914, was deemed an unnecessary proceeding and without legal effect, as it was merely a confirmation of the Supreme Court's decision which had already been entered by the Supreme Court's clerk. Therefore, the writs of execution issued in 1918 were issued long after the five-year period had expired, rendering them legally ineffective. The Court emphasized that the judgment entered by the Supreme Court's clerk on February 3, 1909, was the true and legally effective judgment. On Issue 2: The Court determined that the action to revive the judgment, filed on February 15, 1922, was also filed after the prescriptive period had lapsed. According to Section 43, No. 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an action upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the date of its entry. The judgment in question was entered on February 3, 1909. Therefore, the ten-year prescriptive period expired on February 3, 1919. The action to revive, filed in 1922, was thus filed beyond the prescriptive period. The Court clarified that Section 447 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows for revival by action after five years, does not extend the prescriptive period beyond ten years from the original entry of the judgment; the action must be brought before the judgment prescribes. The Court rejected the argument that the cause of action for revival accrues only after the five-year execution period, stating that the right to enforce a judgment exists from its finality and the revival action must be pursued within the overall ten-year prescriptive limit.
Main Doctrine
The five-year period within which a writ of execution may be issued upon a judgment commences from the date of its entry by the Supreme Court, not from the date of its re-entry or confirmation by the lower court. Furthermore, an action to revive a judgment must be instituted within ten years from the date of its entry, and this period is not extended by the lapse of the five-year execution period; the revival action must be brought before the judgment itself has prescribed.