Reyes v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner, Reverend Father Robert P. Reyes, was arrested on November 30, 2007, during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. He and approximately fifty others were brought to Camp Crame for inquest proceedings. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors conducted these proceedings to determine probable cause for charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion against them. Subsequently, on December 2, 2007, the DOJ Panel filed an Information before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, charging petitioner and 36 others with Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, finding probable cause against them. Procedural History: On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release, arguing that the DOJ panel failed to present evidence of his specific participation and that probable cause determination is a judicial function. The RTC, on December 13, 2007, dismissed the charge of Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause, finding that the evidence did not establish conspiracy or prior knowledge of the intent to commit rebellion. Despite this dismissal, the DOJ Secretary issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 on December 1, 2007, at the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government, listing petitioner and 49 others. Petitioner's counsel requested the lifting of the HDO on December 18, 2007, but the DOJ Secretary deferred action due to a dispute over petitioner's representation. Petitioner was later held at the NAIA on December 19, 2007, due to the HDO, preventing his travel to Hong Kong. The DOJ's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's dismissal order was denied on January 31, 2008. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of amparo, assailing the Court of Appeals' (CA) decision which dismissed his petition. He argues that the DOJ Secretary has no legal basis to issue HDO No. 45, especially after the rebellion case against him was dismissed, and that the continued existence of the HDO constitutes an unlawful restraint on his right to travel. He contends that the writ of amparo is applicable to violations of the right to travel, not just extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The petition is brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking review of the CA's February 4, 2008 Decision and its March 25, 2008 Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
Issue(s)
Whether the Writ of Amparo is the proper legal remedy to protect the right to travel. Whether the petitioner's right to liberty was violated or threatened in a manner that warrants the privilege of the writ. Whether the pendency of a criminal case precludes the filing of a separate petition for a Writ of Amparo.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the Scope of the Writ of Amparo: The Supreme Court ruled that the Writ of Amparo is not the proper remedy for protecting the right to travel. Citing Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, the Court emphasized that the Amparo Rule is specifically confined to instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. The Court defined 'extralegal killings' as those committed without due process and 'enforced disappearances' as arrests or abductions by government agents followed by a refusal to disclose the victim's fate. Since the petitioner's grievance involved a restriction on travel via a Hold Departure Order (HDO), it did not fall within the specific protective mantle of the writ. The Court will not expand the writ's coverage to amorphous grounds that do not involve the highest rights to life and physical security. On the Violation of the Right to Liberty: The Court found that the petitioner failed to establish a violation of liberty actionable under Amparo. While liberty includes the right to be free from arbitrary restraint, the restriction on petitioner's travel was a consequence of a pending criminal investigation and prosecution. The Court noted that the right to travel is not absolute and is subject to constraints imposed by the necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. Petitioner did not demonstrate that the HDO amounted to a serious violation of his right to life or security as defined in jurisprudence. Speculative apprehensions regarding the DOJ's potential denial of a motion to lift the HDO do not constitute the 'clear threat' required for the writ to issue. On the Effect of a Pending Criminal Action: Pursuant to Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the Court held that when a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. Instead, the reliefs available under the writ must be sought by motion in the criminal case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals (CA) finding that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Makati retained jurisdiction over the criminal case and its incidents, including the HDO, by virtue of its residual power. Petitioner's failure to file a motion to lift the HDO in the RTC Makati, as his co-accused had done, was a procedural lapse that barred the separate Amparo petition. The Court stressed that the extraordinary character of the writ requires exhaustion of available remedies within the existing judicial framework.
Main Doctrine
The coverage of the Writ of Amparo is limited to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or threats thereof. While the right to liberty is protected by the writ, this protection is specifically intended to address the intractable problem of state-sponsored or state-acquiesced killings and disappearances. The writ cannot be used as a substitute for other available legal remedies, such as a motion to lift a Hold Departure Order (HDO) in a pending criminal case, nor does it extend to protecting the right to travel in isolation from threats to life or physical security.